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Summary
This thesis consists of three chapters, each of them analyzing relevant issues in the field of
Macroeconomics. The research conducted in all three chapters relies on the methodology of
dynamic general equilibrium models. The microeconomic foundations are at the core of these
type of models, in which rational, forward-looking agents face an uncertain environment. This
methodology has proved to be a powerful tool to address a broad array of economic prob-
lems. The first chapter, “Risk Aversion, Entrepreneurship and Wealth Distribution”, explores
the role of risk aversion heterogeneity on entrepreneurship, saving behavior and the wealth
distribution. The distribution of wealth in the economy is one of the most debated issues in
contemporary politics, popular media, as well as among academic scholars. In particular, the
large concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution observed in many advanced
economies has come under the spotlight. The relevance of this issue has not been undermined
despite the difficulty in estimating the actual levels of wealth held in the hands of the richest
households. Supported by empirical grounds, the theoretical framework to analyze the wealth
distribution should include both entrepreneurship and preference heterogeneity. To this aim,
an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents is developed in which households vary
in their risk aversion, face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, are financially constrained, and
decide to become workers or entrepreneurs. This decision is based on a combination of individ-
ual risk aversion, occupation-specific skills and wealth holdings. It is found that risk aversion
has both a direct and indirect effect on the savings and occupation decision of agents. On one
hand, higher risk aversion deters risky entrepreneurship, and hence the savings aimed at over-
coming financial constraints may be lower. On the other hand, higher risk aversion also leads
to larger precautionary savings which, indirectly, attenuate financial constraints and makes en-
trepreneurship more attractive. In this framework, the latter effect dominates, and more risk
averse agents hold higher levels of wealth and also become entrepreneurs. The most important
contribution of this model is that it allows to disentangle the effects that risk aversion and
financial frictions have on entrepreneurship, which is a key driver of wealth inequality.
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The second chapter is titled “Long-term business relationships, bargaining and monetary
policy” and it is a joint work with Mirko Abbritti and Tommaso Trani. Its motivation stems
from the growing empirical literature documenting the importance of long-term business rela-
tionships and bargaining for price rigidity and firms’ dynamics. This paper introduces long-
term business-to-business (B2B) relationships and price bargaining into a standard monetary
DSGE model. The model is based on two assumptions. First, both wholesale and retail
producers need to spend resources to form new business relationships. Second, once a B2B
relationship is formed, the price is set in a bilateral bargaining between firms. The model
provides a rigorous framework to study the effect of long-term business relationships and bar-
gaining on monetary policy and business cycle dynamics. It shows that these relationships
reduce both the allocative role of intermediate prices and the real effects of monetary policy
shocks. We also find that the model does a good job in replicating the second moments and
cross-correlations of the data, and that it improves over the benchmark New Keynesian model
in explaining some of them.
The third and last chapter of this thesis, “On Staggered Prices and Optimal Inflation”,
is coauthored with one my advisors, Miguel Casares. This paper computes the steady-state
optimal rate of inflation assuming two different sticky-price specifications, Calvo (1983) and
Taylor (1980), in a model with monopolistic competition. We find that the optimal rate of
inflation in steady state is always positive. This result is robust to changes in the degree of
price stickiness. In both cases of staggered prices, the optimal rate of inflation is approximately
equal to the ratio between the rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity. For standard
calibrations, the welfare cost of inflation is quantitatively small but significantly higher under
Calvo pricing than under Taylor pricing.
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Resumen
Esta tesis consta de tres caṕıtulos, cada uno de los cuales analiza temas relevantes en el campo
de la Macroeconomı́a. La investigación realizada en los tres caṕıtulos se basa en la metodoloǵıa
de los modelos dinámicos de equilibrio general. Los fundamentos microeconómicos se encuen-
tran en el núcleo de este tipo de modelos, en los que los agentes forman sus expectativas sobre
el futuro de manera racional. Esta metodoloǵıa ha demostrado ser una herramienta poderosa
para abordar un gran conjunto de problemas económicos. El primer caṕıtulo, “Risk Aver-
sion, Entrepreneurship and Wealth Distribution”, explora el efecto de la heterogeneidad en la
aversión al riesgo sobre el emprendimiento, el comportamiento del ahorro y la distribución
de la riqueza. La distribución de la riqueza es uno de los temas más debatidos no solo en la
poĺıtica contemporánea, si no también en los medios de comunicación y en ámbitos académicos.
En particular, la gran concentración de riqueza en la parte superior de la distribución, que se
observa en muchas economı́as avanzadas, se ha situado en el centro del debate. La relevancia
de este problema no se ha visto socavada a pesar de la dificultad que supone estimar los niveles
de riqueza acumulada en manos de los hogares más ricos. Justificado por razones emṕıricas, el
marco teórico para analizar la distribución de la riqueza debe incluir tanto el emprendimiento
como la heterogeneidad de las preferencias. Con este objetivo, en el primer caṕıtulo se desar-
rolla un modelo de elección ocupacional con agentes heterogéneos en el que los hogares vaŕıan
en su aversión al riesgo, se enfrentan a perturbaciones idiosincrásicas no asegurables, tienen
restricciones financieras y deben decidir si convertirse en trabajadores o en emprendedores.
Esta decisión se basa en una combinación de la aversión al riesgo individual, las habilidades es-
pećıficas en cada ocupación y los niveles de riqueza acumulados. Como resultado se obtiene que
la aversión al riesgo tiene un efecto directo e indirecto en la decisión de ahorro y en la ocupación
de los agentes. Por un lado, una mayor aversión al riesgo disuade a los agentes de convertirse
en emprendedores y, por lo tanto, los ahorros destinados a superar las restricciones financieras
son menores. Por otro lado, una mayor aversión al riesgo también conduce a un mayor ahorro
por motivo de precaución que, indirectamente, atenúa las restricciones financieras y hace que la
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opción de convertirse en emprendedor sea más atractiva. En el modelo desarrollado, el último
efecto domina, y los agentes con mayor aversión al riesgo acumulan mayores niveles de riqueza
y también se convierten en emprendedores. La contribución más importante de este modelo es
que permite desentrañar los efectos que la aversión al riesgo y las fricciones financieras tienen
sobre el emprendimiento, que es un factor clave para explicar la desigualdad en la acumulación
de la riqueza.
El segundo caṕıtulo se titula “Long-term business relationships, bargaining and monetary
policy” y es un trabajo conjunto con Mirko Abbritti y Tommaso Trani. Su motivación se deriva
de la creciente literatura emṕırica que documenta la importancia de las relaciones comerciales
a largo plazo y los procesos de negociación sobre la rigidez de los precios y las dinámicas em-
presariales. Este art́ıculo introduce relaciones comerciales entre empresas (B2B) a largo plazo
y procesos de negociación de precios en un modelo monetario de equilibrio general dinámico
estocástico (DSGE) estándar. El modelo se basa en dos suposiciones. Primero, tanto los
productores mayoristas como los minoristas necesitan gastar recursos para formar nuevas rela-
ciones comerciales. Segundo, una vez que se forma una relación comercial, el precio se establece
en una negociación bilateral entre las empresas. El modelo proporciona un marco riguroso para
estudiar el efecto de las relaciones comerciales a largo plazo y los procesos de negociación so-
bre la poĺıtica monetaria y la dinámica del ciclo económico. Además, se demuestra que estas
relaciones comerciales reducen tanto el papel de asignación de los precios intermedios como
los efectos reales de las perturbaciones de la poĺıtica monetaria. También encontramos que el
modelo hace un gran trabajo al replicar los segundos momentos y las correlaciones cruzadas
de los datos, y que mejora con respecto al modelo de referencia Neo Keynesiano en explicar
dichos estad́ısticos.
El tercer y último caṕıtulo de esta tesis, “On Staggered Prices and Optimal Inflation”, es
coautoreado con uno de mis directores, Miguel Casares. En este art́ıculo se calcula la tasa de
inflación óptima en estado estacionario bajo dos especificaciones de rigidez de precios diferentes,
Calvo (1983) y Taylor (1980), en un modelo con competencia monopoĺıstica. Encontramos que
la tasa óptima de inflación en estado estacionario es siempre positiva. Este resultado es robusto
a los cambios en el grado de rigidez de los precios. En ambos casos con rigidez de precios, la
tasa de inflación óptima es aproximadamente igual al cociente entre la tasa de descuento y la
elasticidad de Dixit-Stiglitz. Para calibraciones estándar, el coste de bienestar de la inflación
es cuantitativamente pequeño, pero significativamente más alto si los precios son ŕıgidos à la
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1 — Risk Aversion, Entrepreneurship
and Wealth Distribution
1.1 Introduction
Inequality, its causes and consequences have always been of great interest for economists.
Adam Smith (1776) affirms that “No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which
the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable.”. Yet, despite its timeless appeal,
it has been only in recent years that inequality in earnings, income and wealth has become
among the most debated issues in contemporary politics and economics.1 Empirically, a larger
concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution has been observed in many advanced
economies. In 2014, the average shares of wealth in the OECD countries held by the richest
10%, 5% and 1% of the population were 50.91%, 37.57% and 17.78%, respectively.2,3 Among
these countries the one with the highest concentration in the top was the U.S. in 2016, where
the richest 10%, 5% and 1% of the population held 79.47%, 68.05% and 42.48% of the wealth,
respectively. Understanding why people save is not only necessary to explain why some people
become rich while others remain poor, but also to provide an adequate guidance to policy
makers on which instruments to use to tackle inequality.
The purpose of this paper is to study the role of risk aversion heterogeneity on entrepreneur-
ship, saving behavior and the wealth distribution. The analysis is carried out in a model in
which households vary in their risk aversion, face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, are finan-
cially constrained, and decide to become workers or entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are house-
holds who own and run a business, and receive its profits as compensation for their labor.
1See for example Piketty (2014), Saez and Zucman (2016) and Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016), among others.
From the political side Senator Bernie Sanders, while campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination
in 2015, listed “Income and Wealth Inequality” as one of the most important issues for the American people.
2See Figure A1.1 in the Appendix.
3Average computed for year 2014 or latest available: Spain and Canada (2012), Estonia, Finland, Ireland
and Portugal (2013), Denmark (2015), US (2016).
1
The most important contribution of this model is that it allows to disentangle the effects that
risk aversion and financial frictions have on entrepreneurship, which is a key driver of wealth
concentration. Households sort themselves between the different occupations based on their
risk aversion, occupation-specific ability and wealth holdings. In accordance with empirical
evidence, at the individual level, the entry decision into entrepreneurship is deterred by higher
values of risk aversion, as well as by low wealth holdings.4 This has important implications for
the saving behavior. On one hand, more risk averse households are discouraged from entry into
risky entrepreneurship, and hence the savings aimed at overcoming financial constraints may
be lower. On the other hand, higher risk aversion also leads to larger precautionary savings.
In this framework, the precautionary motives channel leads to higher savings which, indirectly,
reduce the financial constraints and makes entrepreneurship a more profitable option. Conse-
quently, at the aggregate level, more risk averse agents hold higher levels of wealth and also
become entrepreneurs. This result is very relevant for two reasons. Firstly, it complements the
existing literature on entrepreneurship and wealth distribution that argues that entrepreneurs
save more to overcome borrowing constraints, explaining the higher concentration of wealth in
the upper tail of the distribution. The introduction of risk aversion heterogeneity uncovers an
additional channel that connects savings and entrepreneurship. The coexistence of individuals
with different attitudes towards risk implies that, ceteris paribus, the more risk averse have
higher precautionary savings, which indirectly reduce their borrowing constraints and makes
them more prone to become entrepreneurs because they can run larger firms and therefore have
higher profits. Moreover, this new channel also indicates that the distribution of risk aversion
has an effect on the wealth distribution. In particular, distributions that display higher shares
of more risk averse individuals are associated with lower levels of wealth inequality.
And secondly, the findings of this paper suggest that, in the presence of risk aversion
heterogeneity and financial frictions, the decision to become an entrepreneur may not be fully
determined by attitudes towards risk. One of the most prominent theories of entrepreneurship
establishes that less risk averse individuals become entrepreneurs while the more risk averse
become workers (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Feng and Rauch, 2015). This theory seems to be,
to some extent, empirically supported by Barsky et al. (1997) who, using survey data from the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), estimate the predictive power of preferences over risky
behaviors, such as the decisions to smoke and drink, to buy insurance, to be self-employed,
4Barsky et al. (1997), Cramer et al. (2002), Ekelund et al. (2005), Dohmen et al. (2011) and Falk et al.
(2018) among others, document a negative relation between risk aversion and entrepreneurship. A good survey
of the empirical evidence on how borrowing constraints affect entrepreneurship can be found in Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006).
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and to hold stock. They find that individuals with higher risk tolerance are more likely to
become entrepreneurs. However, none of these references take into account the existence of
financial frictions, which has been proved to be an important determinant of entrepreneurship.
Actually, the findings of this paper suggest that when risk aversion heterogeneity is considered
in conjunction with financial frictions, the relevance of the latter on the decision to entry
into entrepreneurship dominates and therefore the negative relation between risk aversion and
entrepreneurship disappears at the aggregate level.5 In other words, if one wants to understand
who becomes an entrepreneur it is not enough to focus on the risk preferences of individuals.
Further motivation for this research is provided by the following arguments. One is to
take into consideration the empirical evidence referenced above that documents how less risk
averse individuals tend to become entrepreneurs more frequently than more risk averse indi-
viduals.6 If individuals have to decide whether to become entrepreneurs or workers, it comes
naturally that this decision is partly based on their risk preferences. Another argument is
to provide a framework that can combine the two main purposes why people save, i.e., to
smooth consumption through time and to overcome borrowing constraints. Models that only
consider risk aversion heterogeneity but do not include entrepreneurship find that more risk
averse individuals save more for precautionary motives and accumulate higher levels of wealth.
Alternatively, models with entrepreneurship but without risk aversion heterogeneity find that
households that want to become entrepreneurs accumulate more wealth to overcome borrow-
ing constraints. The findings of this paper reconcile these previous results and show that,
in the presence of risk aversion heterogeneity and financial frictions, precautionary savings are
quantitatively substantial and, indirectly, attenuate borrowing constraints, which drives house-
holds into entrepreneurship, making them wealthier than workers. This implies that, at the
aggregate level, there is a positive relation between wealth and risk aversion. This may seem
counterintuitive but it is actually supported by the empirical finding of Paravisini et al. (2017)
who estimate risk aversion from investors’ financial decisions and find that wealthier investors
are more risk averse in the cross section.
Bewley (1977) provides a powerful theoretical framework to quantitatively analyze wealth
inequality, the literature to which this paper relates to. In a recent survey article, De Nardi
and Fella (2017) argue that, within that class of models, two of the main forces that pro-
5Falk et al. (2018) find that at the individual level, more risk tolerant individuals are more likely to become
entrepreneurs. However, they also find that at the country level risk taking is not significantly positively related
to entrepreneurial activities.
6Henceforth, I use the terms “entrepreneur” and “self-employed” interchangeably. In this I follow Quadrini
(2000).
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vide a better approximation of the shape of the wealth distribution are entrepreneurship and
preference heterogeneity. The most influential papers connecting entrepreneurship and wealth
inequality are Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). They show that introducing
entrepreneurship is key to generate a higher concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the
distribution, an empirical feature that the seminal paper of Aiyagari (1994) is not able to repli-
cate. Actually, according to Kuhn and Rios-Rull (2016), business wealth and business income
are the most important sources of wealth and income inequality in the U.S., accounting for
about 20%. It is also worth noticing that, despite the fact that entrepreneurs only constitute
about 8% of the population in the U.S., they hold approximately 40% of total net wealth, a
rather large share (De Nardi and Fella, 2017).7 Notwithstanding, none of these models include
preference heterogeneity and therefore do not consider the effect that this may have on their
results.
There is also a large empirical literature documenting preference heterogeneity among in-
dividuals and how these differences in preferences are associated with different behaviors. As
mentioned before, Barsky et al. (1997) find substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences across
individuals and that risk tolerance has predictive power for choice over risky behaviors.8 These
results are confirmed by Kimball et al. (2008, 2009), who additionally find that differences
in risk preferences are persistent through time. This is important because if people are not
choosing their occupation purely based on their productivity, in the presence of uninsurable
risk, output may not be maximized (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011).9 Also, when studying the impor-
tance of precautionary savings for wealth accumulation, Cagetti (2003) finds that differences in
wealth holdings can arise from differences in risk aversion and the degree of household patience.
Despite the fact that risk aversion and entrepreneurship seem to be closely related, to the
best of my knowledge, I am the first to analyze how the combination of both can affect the
wealth distribution.10 The closest related papers to the study of this relation are Herranz et al.
(2015) and Cozzi (2011). Nevertheless, both depart in important ways from the model proposed
in this paper. On one hand, Herranz et al. (2015) analyze the interactions between risk aversion
7Small businesses (fewer than 500 employees) play an important role in the U.S. economy. In 2008, small
businesses produced 46% of the private nonfarm GDP (Kobe, 2012). According to the U.S. Small Business
Administration, in 2014, small businesses employed 47.8% of the private workforce.
8Chiappori and Paiella (2011) and Paravisini et al. (2017) also find risk aversion heterogeneity.
9One could think of this as some type of labor missallocation. The most efficient outcome in terms of
aggregate production would be obtained by matching households with the jobs they are most productive at,
regardless of the risk these involve. If this is not the case, an increase in aggregate output could be obtained
by reallocating workers to different jobs.
10Knight (1921) was one of the first to study this connection between risk aversion and entrepreneurship.
For more recent work see Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Barsky et al. (1997), Kimball et al. (2008, 2009) and
Hvide and Panos (2014).
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heterogeneity and entrepreneurship to study firm size, capital structure and default, but their
model does not provide any results on the wealth distribution, which is an essential issue in
this paper. On the other hand, Cozzi (2011) develops a model with risk aversion heterogeneity,
uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, and (with or without) self-selection into risky jobs to
quantify their effects on the distribution of wealth. However, the way the occupational choice
is modeled in that paper is completely different from the one followed here. In his model there
are no entrepreneurs, jobs only differ in their income risk and workers make a once-in-a-lifetime
decision on their career. The absence of entrepreneurs is non-trivial because it eliminates the
saving motive to overcome borrowing constraints. Without this mechanism, households only
save for precautionary motives, which do not suffice to match the wealth holdings of the top 1%
of the population, a fact that the model in this paper is perfectly able to replicate. Therefore,
the model proposed below attempts to fill this gap and analyzes the effects that the interactions
between risk aversion heterogeneity and entrepreneurship may have on saving behavior and the
wealth distribution.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 describe the
quantitative model and the calibration strategy, respectively. The interactions between risk
aversion heterogeneity and entrepreneurship, and their effect on the wealth distribution are
discussed in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 addresses remaining work and future extensions. Finally,
section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of households with unit mass, which are ex ante
heterogeneous in terms of their risk aversion. Following the evidence documented by Kimball
et al. (2008), it is assumed that the risk aversion of households is constant through time.11
In each period, they have to decide whether they want to be an entrepreneur or a worker in
the next period. The structure of the model is similar to Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006), where there are two sectors of production, the entrepreneurial sector and the
non-entrepreneurial or corporate sector. Also, households are heterogenous in their abilities as
workers and entrepreneurs.
11See Figure A1.2 in the Appendix.
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1.2.1 Households









where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor rate, ct is consumption and let and lwt denote en-
trepreneurial and worker labor supplied, respectively. In particular, it is assumed that utility




t ;σi) = c
1−σi
t /(1− σi)− ϕelet − ϕwlwt . Each household
is endowed with one indivisible unit of time that can be either supplied to the market as a
worker or employed in one’s own business as an entrepreneur. This occupational choice de-
cision was made in the previous period. The potentially different values of the disutility of
each type of labor, ϕe and ϕw, can have different justifications. On one hand it could capture
non-pecuniary benefits associated to entrepreneurship such as flexibility of hours or being one’s
own boss (see for example Hurst and Pugsley (2011) and Yurdagul (2017)). On the other hand
there is empirical evidence suggesting that entrepreneurs have different Frisch elasticity from
workers (Martinez et al., 2018).
Figure 1.1 describes the timing of events within a period. At the beginning of every period,
each household is exogenously endowed with two types of abilities, one for each occupation.
These abilities are stochastic, serially correlated, and uncorrelated with each other. The en-
trepreneurial ability (η) determines the level of productivity that the household can achieve
from running his own business. The working ability (ε) captures the units of labor efficiencies.
These units, which are equally productive in both sectors of production, are supplied to the
labor market in exchange for the wage rate w. The assumption that households have to decide
their next-period occupation without knowing their future abilities is made to introduce un-
certainty and provides a more realistic scenario to study the combined effects of risk aversion
and entrepreneurship on the accumulation of wealth. Each ability follows a first order Markov
process where Γη and Γε are the transition probability matrices of the entrepreneurial and
worker ability, respectively.
1.2.2 Production
The production side of the economy is composed of two sectors. On one hand, the en-
trepreneurial sector represents the set of small firms in the economy, where each of them
is owned by the household that runs it. On the other hand, the corporate sector is composed
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Figure 1.1: Timing of events within a period
t
Realization of current entrepreneurial
ability (η) and worker ability (ε)
Entrepreneurial (y) & corporate
production (Yc) take place
Current consump-





by large units of production. As in previous work, two important differences between sectors
are the uninsurable risk and borrowing constraints, that only affect entrepreneurs. Firms from
both sectors rent capital, which depreciates at a constant rate δ, and hire workers in competitive
markets to produce an homogeneous good.
Entrepreneurial Sector
The entrepreneurial sector is composed by those households that in the previous period decided
to run a business in the current period, and receive the profits as a compensation for their labor.
The production function is given by
y = f(η, k, l) = ηkαnν (1.1)
where α+ν ∈ (0, 1), which implies diminishing returns to scale on capital and labor. This form
of the production function serves a twofold motive. On one hand, diminishing returns to scale
guarantee the existence of positive profits so entrepreneurs can be compensated for their labor.
On the other hand, they imply a better description of the small-sized firms in the economy.
The household-specific entrepreneurial ability is given by η, the amount of labor hired is n,
and k is the amount of capital invested in the business.
The amount of capital that an entrepreneur can invest in his business is limited by his wealth
holdings (a). Since the focus on this paper is on the effect of risk aversion on occupational
choice, a simple specification of the borrowing constraint is assumed. Following Buera (2009),
entrepreneurs cannot invest a capital amount higher than a multiple of their wealth, k ≤ λa,
where λ ≥ 1. If λ = 1 the entrepreneurs’ wealth sets the upper limit on the capital they
can invest in their own business. As λ increases, the borrowing constraint is relaxed and
entrepreneurs can invest beyond their current wealth holdings.
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Therefore, the static optimization problem of entrepreneurs is
Π̃(η, k, n, a;λ) = max
k,n
{ηkαnν − (r + δ)k − wn}
s.t. k ≤ λa
where r is the net risk-free rate between the previous and current period, and w is the wage
rate. Given that the amount of labor hired is not constrained, the problem can be rewritten
in terms of the entrepreneurial ability and capital
Π(η, k, a;λ) = max
k
{
Aφ (ηkα)φ − (r + δ)k
}
s.t. k ≤ λa
where Aφ = (1− ν)(ν/w)ν/(1−ν) and φ = 1/(1− ν). Notice that the borrowing constraint will













is higher than λa. Hence, the capital and labor demand of each entrepreneur are given by:
k(η, a) =
k
∗ if k∗ ≤ λa
λa if k∗ > λa






This implies that wealth alone does not determine which entrepreneurs are going to be fi-
nancially constrained, but a combination of wealth and entrepreneurial ability. Therefore, it
is possible to have a situation where there are two entrepreneurs with different wealth levels
and only the one with higher wealth is constrained. In other words, households with higher
entrepreneurial entrepreneurial ability will also have a higher optimal level of capital, which
might not be feasible despite having more wealth than a low-entrepreneurial-ability household,
who is not financially constrained because it has a lower optimal level of capital. The necessity
to overcome this financial friction is going to motivate entrepreneurs to save more and it is
going to be an important element of the model to explain wealth accumulation. Hence, how
much individuals decide to save is going to be affected by their occupation-specific ability,
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degree of risk aversion and wealth holdings.
Corporate Sector







where Kc and Lc are the capital input and efficiency units of labor used, respectively. As
opposed to the entrepreneurial sector, the corporate sector does not display financial frictions.
1.2.3 Entrepreneurs’ Problem
At the beginning of the period, the set of state variables for an entrepreneur is (a, η, ε). Let
V (a, η, ε) denote the value function of an entrepreneur before the occupational choice is made,
V w(a, η, ε) denote the value function of an entrepreneur today that has decided to become a
worker in the next period and V e(a, η, ε) denote the value function of an entrepreneur today
that has decided to continue being an entrepreneur in the next period. Hence, the beginning-
of-period value function of an entrepreneur with risk aversion σ is12
V (a, η, ε;σ) = Max [V e(a, η, ε;σ), V w(a, η, ε;σ)] (1.3)
The Bellman equation of an entrepreneur today that continues as an entrepreneur is the
next period is13
V e(a, η, ε;σ) = max
{c,a′,k}
{u(c;σ) + βEV (a′, η′, ε′;σ)}
s.t. c = a(1 + r) + Π(η, k, a;λ)− a′
k ≥ 0, a′ ≥ 0
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The expected value of the function is taken with respect
to (η′, ε′), conditional on (η, ε). The first constraint is the budget constraint, which includes
the undepreciated capital and the profits from the entrepreneurs’ own business, Π(η, k, a;λ).
12To be more rigorous, all the control variables should be indexed by the risk aversion of the individual.
However, to keep notation simple I refrain from doing so.
13Technically, the instantaneous utility function depends not only on consumption but also on both types of
labor. However, in order to provide a cleaner analysis of the effects of risk aversion on occupational choice, the
labor disutility parameters ϕe and ϕw are set to zero and the utility function is rewritten as u(c) = c
1−σ/(1−σ).
This will be modified in future calibrations.
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The problem of an entrepreneur that decides to become a worker in the next period is given
by
V w(a, η, ε;σ) = max
{c,a′,k}
{u(c;σ) + βEJ(a′, η′, ε′;σ)}
s.t. c = a(1 + r) + Π(η, k, a;λ)− a′
k ≥ 0, a′ ≥ 0
where J(a′, η′, ε′;σ) is the value function of a worker at the beginning of the period (before the
occupational choice for the next period is made) and is the only difference between this and the
previous problem. The details of this function J(·) are explained in the following paragraphs.
1.2.4 Workers’ Problem
At the beginning of the period, the set of state variables for a worker is (a, η, ε), the same as for
the entrepreneur. Let J(a, η, ε;σ) denote the value function of a worker before the occupational
choice is made, Jw(a, η, ε;σ) denote the value function of a worker today that has decided to
continue as a worker in the next period and Je(a, η, ε;σ) denote the value function of a worker
today that has decided to become an entrepreneur in the next period. Hence,
J(a, η, ε;σ) = Max [Je(a, η, ε;σ), Jw(a, η, ε;σ)] (1.4)
The Bellman equation of a worker today that becomes an entrepreneur is the next period
is
Je(a, η, ε;σ) = max
{c,a′}
{u(c;σ) + βEV (a′, η′, ε′;σ)}
s.t. c = a(1 + r) + wε− a′
a′ ≥ 0
Like in the entrepreneurs’ problem the first constraint is the budget constraint and the only
difference is that instead of profits and undepreciated capital the household receives the wage
income.
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If a worker continues being a worker in the next period his problem is given by
Je(a, η, ε;σ) = max
{c,a′}
{u(c;σ) + βEJ(a′, η′, ε′;σ)}
s.t. c = a(1 + r) + wε− a′
a′ ≥ 0
1.2.5 Stationary Equilibrium
Suppose there are Nσ different types of risk aversion, each with mass ωi. Therefore, we have∑Nσ
i=1 ωi = 1. Let xi = (ai, ηi, εi, θi) be the state vector for a household with risk aversion
σi, where θi ∈ {Worker, Entrepreneur} denotes current occupation. The state vector of the
economy is x =
∑Nσ
i=1 ωixi = (a, η, ε, θ) .
A steady state recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of:





2. For each risk aversion type i, decision functions c(xi), a
′(xi), k(xi), n(xi) (entrepreneurs’
labor demand) and occupational choice θ′(xi).
3. Interest rate r and wage rate w.
4. Aggregate capital and labor demands for the corporate and entrepreneurial sector:








θ k(ai, ηi, εi, θi)µi






θ n(ai, ηi, εi, θi)µi
5. For each risk aversion type, a function mapping the space of each households distribution




1. The decision rules c(xi), a
′(xi), k(xi), n(xi) and θ
′(xi) solve the maximization problems
described before.
2. Prices (w, r) are competitive, i.e. interest rate r = MPKc− δ and wage rate w = MPLc.
3. Capital and labor markets clear:




















4. The distribution µ∗i is a fixed point of the transition function Qi where, given the subsets
Sa, Sη, Sε and Sθ, is defined as








where I(xi) = 1 if a′i(x) and θ′i(x) are the optimal asset policy function and occupational
choice, and 0 otherwise.
The computational algorithm is described in the appendix.
1.3 Calibration
The calibration of the model follows a parsimonious approach. As a general strategy, the
objective is to match some features observed in U.S. data by choosing a reduced number of
parameters. Parameters that are standard to many other models such as the elasticity of
output with respect to capital, time preference, depreciation rate, etc., will be taken from the
existing literature. No parameter will be chosen to directly match the distribution of wealth,
which is something that should be obtained endogenously from the model. Given that one of
the key issues in the model is entrepreneurship, it is important to find the empirical definition
of entrepreneur that is as close as possible to the one portrayed in the theoretical model.
Following Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), who use Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data,
entrepreneurs are households declared as self-employed, own a business, and have an active
management role in it.
Table 1.1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.895 Discount Factor
δ 0.06 Depreciation Rate
α 0.36 Entrep. Capital Income Share
ν 0.55 Entre. Labor Income Share
Ω 0.36 Corp. Capital Income Share
λ 2.00 Borrowing Constraint
The calibration strategy is as follows. First, a model in which there is only one type of risk
aversion is calibrated to match some selected descriptive statistics of U.S. data. Then, these
parameters are fixed in the model in which households have different levels of risk aversion.
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The purpose of this strategy is to provide a clear picture of the contribution of introducing risk
aversion heterogeneity. This process is done for different distributions of the risk aversion, and
the differences between the results of each calibration are analyzed.
Preferences
Each period in the model corresponds to a year. The discount factor parameter is set at
β = 0.895, as a compromise between the values used in Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti and
De Nardi (2006), the two main references that analyze the effects of entrepreneurship on the
wealth distribution, which are 0.934 and 0.865, respectively. As a compromise, in this model β
is set between these two values and is equal to 0.895.14 This delivers a wealth-to-output ratio
between 2.5 and 3, as found in U.S. data.
In an expected utility framework, the parameter of the CRRA utility function σ captures
the risk aversion. The use of these preferences is supported by the findings of Chiappori and
Paiella (2011), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), Dohmen et al. (2011), and Sahm (2012), among
others, who document that relative risk aversion is constant through time and independent of
wealth.15 Kimball et al. (2008), using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, estimate that
the risk aversion parameter takes values between 4 and 10.4, which are much higher than the
values used in the literature. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, the same
authors estimate again the risk aversion parameter (Kimball et al., 2009) and find that it ranges
from 1.4 to 6.7, which continue to be much higher than standard values.16 If these values where
to be used in this paper, the results found will significantly differ from those in the existing
literature. However, these differences would mostly be explained by the higher values, not by
their heterogeneity, which is the main object being studied here. Therefore, the calibration
approach of the risk aversion is going to be very conservative, and the values used will be the
most commonly assumed by researchers. This will obviously reduce the differences between
the results of this paper and those from previous studies. However, it seems a reasonable
starting point and, if anything, it will set a lower bound on the importance of the contribution
of considering risk aversion heterogeneity.
14In Bewley models in general equilibrium, β(1 + r) < 1 is satisfied. Otherwise individuals accumulate an
infinitely large amount of assets.
15In the future, I plan to extend the model introducing Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences. The suitability
of this preference specification stems from the fact that it breaks the relation between the risk aversion and
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution imposed by other specifications such as the CRRA preferences.
However, for the moment I work with CRRA preferences to make my results more relatable to those in the
existing literature.
16Even though the lower bound (1.4) and the second lowest value (2.2) are close to the values commonly
used, the individuals with these values represent a very small fraction, less that 20%.
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Hence, for the version of the model without risk aversion heterogeneity (Model I), the unique
value is σ = 1.5. This value is chosen not only because it is standard but also because it is the
midpoint of the range of the most used values [1, 2]. Actually, the versions of the model with risk
aversion heterogeneity only consider three possible values of risk aversion, σ ∈ {1, 1.5, 2}.17 The
model is solved for different distributions of the risk aversion, which are reported in Table 1.2.
The distribution of Model II is chosen to analyzed the different results implied by having the
same expected risk aversion as in Model I but including heterogeneity. This can be thought of
as a mean preserving spread of the model without risk aversion heterogeneity. The distributions
of models III, IV and V are motivated by the empirical studies mentioned before that estimate
the risk tolerance of survey respondents and find that the majority of the population has a
relatively high level of risk aversion.18
Table 1.2: Risk Aversion Distributions (household shares)
ωσ=1 ωσ=1.5 ωσ=2
Model I 0 1 0
Model II 1/3 1/3 1/3
Model III 0.2 0.3 0.5
Model IV 0.1 0.2 0.7
Model V 0.05 0.1 0.85
Production Technologies
The capital depreciation rate δ is set to the standard value of 0.06. The elasticity of output
with respect to capital in the entrepreneurial sector α and in the corporate sector Ω is equal to
0.36. Given that the entrepreneurial technology exhibits diminishing returns to scale, it is the
case that α + ν < 1. Therefore, ν takes the value 0.55, which implies a degree of diminishing
returns to scale of 9% and it is close to that chosen by Luo et al. (2010). The estimations of
the borrowing constraint parameter λ in Buera (2009) are 1.01 and 4.90. As a compromise, an
intermediate value of 2 is chosen, which implies that the amount of capital that entrepreneurs
can borrow to invest in their own firm represents at most 50% of the total capital they use to
produce.
17This also implies and important reduction in the dispersion of the risk aversion compared to the findings
of (Kimball et al., 2008, 2009).
18See Figure A1.2 in the Appendix.
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Labor Abilities
An important element in the analysis are the stochastic processes for the labor skills. There
are many estimated processes of the labor income of workers in the literature. Given that this
paper builds on Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), their calibration of the worker ability is followed.
In their paper it is assumed that the logarithm of the household’s labor ability as worker ε
follows an autoregressive process of order one with persistence equal to 0.95. They calibrate the
variance of the AR(1) process targeting the average Gini coefficient for labor earnings found
in the PSID, which is equal to 0.38. This process is approximated with a five-state Markov




0.7375 0.2473 0.0150 0.0002 0.0000
0.1947 0.5555 0.2328 0.0169 0.0001
0.0113 0.2221 0.5332 0.2221 0.0113
0.0001 0.0169 0.2328 0.5555 0.1947
0.0000 0.0002 0.0150 0.2473 0.7375

Entrepreneurial abilities η are calibrated in a slightly different way from Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006). The values of η are proposed to match the Gini coefficient for wealth in the U.S., which
is equal to 0.80. This process is approximated with a two-state Markov chain Γη that takes
the values η = {0, 2}. Following Quadrini (2000), the first component of the entrepreneurial






1.4.1 Risk Aversion Heterogeneity and Entrepreneurship
Risk aversion is at the heart of many economic decisions. It affects how much individuals save
and invest, their occupational choice, how much labor they supply, their portfolio composition,
etc. As already mentioned before, the seminal article of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) was one
of the first to develop a theory of entrepreneurship based on the risk aversion of individuals.
In their framework, less risk averse agents become entrepreneurs while more risk averse agents
decide to be workers. This is not only intuitive but also supported by the data. The most
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recent empirical study analyzing the relationship between risk aversion and entrepreneurship
is the article of Falk et al. (2018), who find that, at the individual level, this relationship is
negative. The relationship between risk aversion and entrepreneurship can also be important
for macroeconomic dynamics. For example, Candian and Dmitriev (2016) show that the quan-
titative importance of financial shocks crucially depends on the risk aversion of entrepreneurs.
In the same vein, Rampini (2004) finds that the risk aversion of entrepreneurs increases the
volatility of economic activity.19
However, risk aversion is not the only variable affecting entrepreneurship. Both the empir-
ical and theoretical literature, have considered that skills and wealth holdings are also among
the most important determinants of entrepreneurship.20 Therefore, I analyze the effects of
the risk aversion distribution on entrepreneurship, in a model where the occupational choice
decision depends on wealth endowments and on the relative skills between working and en-
trepreneurial activity. To this aim Figure 1.2 displays the occupational choice for the next
period made by entrepreneurs, for different values of risk aversion, occupation-specific ability
and wealth holdings.
Each row from Figure 1.2 corresponds to a different value of entrepreneurial ability. Hence,
the first row represents the lowest realization of such ability. Each column varies the worker
ability. Wealth is represented in the horizontal axis, and the range of values depicted on top
and bottom panel is adjusted to make visible the threshold at which households switch their
occupational choice for the next period.21 The solid blue line represents the occupational choice
decision of households with low risk aversion (σ = 1), the dashed red line represents that of
households with medium risk aversion (σ = 1.5), and the dash-dot yellow line captures the
choice of households with high risk aversion (σ = 2).
First, it can be observed that the entrepreneurial ability is key in the decision on whether
to become a worker or stay as an entrepreneur. If the household has low entrepreneurial ability
today, it is very likely that he will maintain the same ability in the next period. Consequently,
the level of wealth holdings required to continue as an entrepreneur in the next period is much
higher than if the household had high entrepreneurial ability today. This effect is reinforced by
19Actually, the interest of risk aversion for macroeconomists extends well beyond its connection to en-
trepreneurship. Tallarini (2000) argues that risk aversion is important to understand asset market dynamics
and the welfare costs of business cycles whereas Gourio (2012) claims that for high and time-varying levels of
risk, risk aversion has strong effects in macroeconomic dynamics.
20Lucas (1978) develops a theory of entrepreneurship based on managerial talent where the high-skilled
individuals become entrepreneurs. The relevance of the wealth holdings is justified by the presence of borrowing
constraints. See the introduction for references on entrepreneurship and financial frictions.
21The occupational choice of workers for next period, which is very similar to that of entrepreneurs, can be
found in the appendix in Figure A1.3.
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Notes: This figure corresponds to Model II, where risk aversion is uniformly distributed.
Solid blue line: households with σ = 1; dashed red line: households with σ = 1.5; dash-dot
yellow line: households with σ = 2.
the fact that low entrepreneurial ability is more persistent than high entrepreneurial ability.
Also, notice that the distance between wealth thresholds, above which the household re-
mains as entrepreneur, for different levels of risk aversion is much coarser for the low en-
trepreneurial ability case. This implies, that the effect of risk aversion on the occupational
choice decision is quite asymmetric for different realizations of entrepreneurial ability. In partic-
ular, this effect is much higher for the case where the household has low entrepreneurial ability.
In other words, the occupational choice decision among households with high entrepreneurial
ability depends less on their risk aversion than for households with low entrepreneurial ability.
Second, for a given level of risk aversion, the wealth threshold above which the household
continues as an entrepreneur is increasing in the ability as a worker, which seems reasonable.
As the alternative to entrepreneurship has a higher expected payoff, the decision to continue as
an entrepreneur is deterred. Once again, the effect of risk aversion is significantly asymmetric
and considerably larger for the households with low entrepreneurial ability. Actually, a high-
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risk-averse entrepreneur today with low entrepreneurial ability and high worker ability will
never decide to continue as an entrepreneur in the next period, no matter what his wealth
holdings are. From the findings of Figure 1.2, it can be concluded that, in line with the
existing literature, at the individual level, there is a negative relationship between risk aversion
and entrepreneurship.







Model II 5.17 6.41 7.31
Model III 4.31 5.96 7.32
Model IV 4.16 5.98 7.00
Model V 3.68 5.88 6.78
However, we find an alternative result in general equilibrium: the negative effect that risk
aversion has on entry into entrepreneurship does not deter the most risk averse individuals
from actually becoming entrepreneurs. By looking at Table 1.3, which shows the share of en-
trepreneurs by risk aversion type, we can see that the percentage of households who opt for
entrepreneurship is greater for higher levels of risk aversion. In other words, at the aggregate
level, the negative relationship between entrepreneurship and risk aversion found at the in-
dividual level does not hold. This happens because more risk averse households have higher
precautionary savings, which indirectly relax the financial frictions and make entrepreneurship
more attractive. This result holds for different model calibrations, where the household share
that has the highest level of risk aversion is larger. In other words, the numbers in this table
indicate that, even though higher risk aversion deters entry into entrepreneurship, this effect
is not dominant.
A similar conclusion can be obtained by looking at Table 1.4. This table displays how
risk aversion is distributed within entrepreneurs. Even though one might expect that, among
entrepreneurs, those with lower risk aversion should represent a larger share, this is not the
case. The fact that this happens for the case where risk aversion is uniformly distributed means
that it is not originated by an ad hoc distribution in which the majority of the households has
high risk aversion. Still, this result is reinforced for different risk aversion distributions with
increasing number of high-risk-aversion households. What is even more stunning is that, as
the share of high-risk-aversion households increases, so does the total share of entrepreneurs.
These results point towards an interesting finding: the negative effect that risk aversion
has on entry into entrepreneurship is neutralized and surpassed by an opposite indirect effect,
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Model II 27.34 33.95 38.71 6.30
Model III 13.67 28.33 58.00 6.31
Model IV 6.39 18.36 75.25 6.51
Model V 2.81 8.99 88.19 6.54
that eventually turns positive the relation between higher risk aversion and entrepreneurship
at the aggregate level. In this model, this indirect effect comes from the higher precautionary
savings of households with higher risk aversion. Since these save more than households with
lower levels of risk aversion, the borrowing constraint is further relaxed for the former, which
makes entry into entrepreneurship more profitable. The relevance of this result is twofold.
Firstly, it complements the existing literature on entrepreneurship and wealth distribution that
argues that entrepreneurs save more to overcome borrowing constraints, and explains the higher
concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution. The introduction of risk aversion
heterogeneity in this model suggests that this effect is reinforced by the precautionary behavior
of more risk averse households, which makes them more prone to become entrepreneurs because
they can run larger firms and have higher profits. Secondly, the findings of this paper suggest
that in the presence of risk aversion heterogeneity, entrepreneurship and financial frictions, the
predictive power of attitudes toward risk that hold at the individual level do not necessarily
hold at the aggregate level.
1.4.2 The Effects of Risk Aversion Heterogeneity and Entrepreneur-
ship on the Wealth Distribution
This subsection examines the relation between risk aversion and wealth distribution. Under-
standing why people save is crucial to explain how wealth is distributed. If policy makers do not
fully comprehend what motivates people to increase or reduce their savings, the instruments
they may use to tackle inequality can have unintended and unwelcome consequences. The
model in this paper combines the two main purposes why people save, which are consumption
smoothing through time and the overcoming of borrowing constraints. The former is directly
related to the risk aversion of individuals, hence the importance of introducing heterogeneity
in this dimension. The latter is specially relevant for entrepreneurs, which are key to explain
the higher levels of wealth concentrated in the upper tail of the distribution.
Figure 1.3 shows how risk aversion is distributed within wealth quintiles. Notice that
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most individuals in the first quintile have low risk aversion. In other words, the majority of
the poorest 20% of the economy are low risk averse households. This share is pretty much
decreasing as we move to higher wealth quintiles. Exactly the opposite happens with the most
risk averse households, which represent the largest share in the fifth quantile. This result
is in line with the empirical findings of Paravisini et al. (2017) who find that the wealthiest
households are the most risk averse ones.
Figure 1.3: Risk Aversion with Wealth Quintiles

























Notes: This figure corresponds to Model II, where risk aversion is uniformly distributed.
Table 1.5: Wealth Distribution
Percentage Wealth in Top
Wealth Gini 0.1% 1% 5% 20% 40%
US Data 0.80 8 30 54 81 94
Model I 0.80 8 33 60 81 94
Model II 0.83 10 36 63 84 95
Model III 0.81 9 34 60 82 94
Model IV 0.78 8 31 57 79 92
Model V 0.77 8 30 55 77 92
Table 1.5 shows how wealth is distributed for different distributions of the risk aversion. Let
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us recall that the only model that has actually been calibrated to match the Gini coefficient of
wealth is Model I, where there is only one type of risk aversion with σ = 1.5 (i.e. medium risk
aversion). Models II-V use the same parameter values as in Model I and the only difference
is the introduction of risk aversion heterogeneity (see Table 1.2). Several interpretations can
be made from this table. First, the model without risk aversion heterogeneity (Model I) does
a good job replicating the wealth distribution, as previously found by Quadrini (2000) and
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).22 Second, and more important for the purpose of this paper,
introducing uniformly-distributed risk aversion heterogeneity (Model II) fails to match the
wealth distribution. Not only its estimation of the Gini coefficient is higher, but also that of all
the percentages of wealth held by the richest ones. Third, assuming that most households have
medium-to-high risk aversion significantly improves the matching of the wealth distribution.
In particular, the risk aversion distribution of Model IV provides a slightly better match of the
wealth distribution than the calibration without risk aversion heterogeneity (Model I), though
it does so at the cost of underestimating the Gini coefficient.23 Fourth, the introduction of
another source of heterogeneity does not necessarily increase wealth inequality. What seems
to matter is how this new source of heterogeneity is distributed. More specifically, increasing
the share of individuals that have higher risk aversion (as documented by empirical studies)
reduces wealth inequality. Actually, comparing Models II and V, the Gini coefficient is six
percentage point lower in the latter.
Table 1.6: Fraction of Entrepreneurs in a Given Wealth Percentile of the Overall U.S. Wealth
Distribution
Wealth Percentile, Top
1% 5% 20% 40%
US Data 54 39 32 22
Model I 55 42 38 24
Model II 50 42 35 23
Model III 48 40 34 23
Model IV 49 40 34 22
Model V 46 39 34 22
More evidence if favor of introducing risk aversion heterogeneity is presented in Table 1.6.
This table shows the fraction of entrepreneurs in a given wealth percentile of the overall U.S.
22One could interpret the fact that this calibration of the model replicates results from previous work as a
validation and relevance of the results discussed in the previous section.
23If we take into account that the Models II to V have not been specifically calibrated, the fact that for some
wealth percentiles they provide a better match than the model without risk aversion heterogeneity (which has
actually been calibrated), suggests that introducing such heterogeneity can provide a better description of the
real world.
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wealth distribution, with data borrowed from Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).24 The empirical
definition of entrepreneur used is “Self-employed business owners”, since this is the one that
more closely resembles the entrepreneurs in the model of this paper. With the exception of
the fraction of entrepreneurs in the top 1% of the wealth distribution, the models risk aversion
heterogeneity do a better job than the model without risk aversion heterogeneity. Actually, as
Table 1.5 already documented, increasing the share of the population with high risk aversion
improves the results.
Table 1.7: Percentage of Entrepreneurs in the Population and Corresponding Share of Total
Wealth Held
Percent in Population Share of Total Wealth
Data 7.60 33.00
Model I 6.58 36.20
Model II 6.30 36.04
Model III 6.31 33.23
Model IV 6.51 31.24
Model V 6.54 30.43
Finally, Table 1.7 shows the percentage of entrepreneurs and their corresponding share of
total wealth. All the different versions of the model, with and without risk aversion hetero-
geneity, underestimate the share of entrepreneurs in the economy, though all the values are
similar to each other and pretty close to the data. Looking at these numbers, we see that intro-
ducing risk aversion heterogeneity has little effect on the share of the population that decides
to entry into entrepreneurship. However, risk aversion heterogeneity, and more importantly its
distribution, seems to have an effect on the share of total wealth held by the entrepreneurs.
1.5 Remaining Work and Possible Extensions
The results provided so far have relied on a parsimonious calibration, which has been made
specifically for the model without risk aversion heterogeneity. Even though these results are
already quite accurate, they may improve with a tailored calibration. Actually, it would be
interesting to increase the range of values of risk aversion. Also, the role of financial frictions has
yet to be explored given that it has been shown that introducing risk aversion heterogeneity has
immediate effects on how the borrowing constraint affects households, which has a significant
impact on both the occupational choice and saving behavior. Finally, an analysis of the effect
of risk aversion heterogeneity on the firm size distribution may deliver interesting results.
24See Table 3 in their paper.
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One possible extension that can bring interesting results could be the following. In the
baseline calibration of my model, it is assumed that the degree of risk aversion is not related with
entrepreneurial ability. However, my framework is rich enough to allow me to parsimoniously
add this relationship which naturally would increase the link between risk aversion and the
decision of becoming an entrepreneur. This idea is supported by the empirical finding that
cognitive skills are positively related with risk taking. Another fruitful avenue could be to
assume Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences. The suitability of this preference specification
stems from the fact that it breaks the relation between the risk aversion and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution imposed by other specifications such as the CRRA preferences.
This may be important because, as documented by Barsky et al. (1997), risk tolerance and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution are essentially uncorrelated across individuals.25
1.6 Conclusions
There is a large empirical literature documenting substantial heterogeneity in risk preferences
and its predictive power for many economic decisions, such as becoming an entrepreneur. Yet,
these findings have not been properly considered by most of the previous work done on wealth
inequality, of which entrepreneurship seems to be a key driving force. This paper explores
the role of risk aversion heterogeneity on entrepreneurship, saving behavior and the wealth
distribution. An occupational choice model is designed in which households vary in their risk
aversion, face uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, are financially constrained, and have to decide
to become workers or entrepreneurs. This decision has different implications for savings, and
agents base it on a combination of their individual risk aversion, occupation-specific skills and
wealth holdings. The most important contribution of this is that it allows us to disentangle
the effects that risk aversion and financial frictions have on entrepreneurship, which is a key
driver of wealth inequality.
The results indicate that the negative effect that risk aversion has on entry into en-
trepreneurship is neutralized and surpassed by an opposite indirect effect, that eventually
turns positive the relation between risk aversion and entrepreneurship. This net effect comes
explained by the higher precautionary savings of households with higher risk aversion. The
additional savings attenuate financial frictions, which makes entry into entrepreneurship more
profitable. The consequences of these results are important for two reasons. On one hand, in-
25Thanks to this property, the use of these preferences has gained popularity in macroeconomics in the last
few years, see Tallarini (2000), Angeletos and Panousi (2011), Caldara et al. (2012), Van Binsbergen et al.
(2012) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), among others.
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troducing risk aversion heterogeneity explains the higher concentration of wealth in the upper
tail due to the precautionary behavior of more risk averse households, which makes them more
prone to become entrepreneurs. On the other hand, risk aversion heterogeneity brings a dis-
crepancy between the attitudes toward risk at the individual level and the general-equilibrium
effects observed at the aggregate level. Finally, the distribution of risk aversion has an addi-
tional effect on the wealth distribution. In particular, there is a negative relationship between
the share of individuals with high risk aversion and overall wealth inequality.
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1.7 Appendix A
Distribution of Wealth in OECD Countries
This figure displays the shares of wealth held by the richest 10%, 5%, and 1% of the population,
for each country. Despite differences across countries, wealth is highly concentrated in the upper
tail of the distribution. Actually, on average more than half of the wealth in OECD countries
is by only 10% of the population.











































































































Source: OECD. Data corresponds to 2014 except Spain and Canada (2012), Estonia, Finland,
Ireland and Portugal (2013), Denmark (2015), US (2016).
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Distribution of Risk Tolerance
This figure is elaborated with the data obtained from Table 2 in Kimball et al. (2008). In
their article they analyze the data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a large-
scale, biennial survey in which individuals where faced with hypothetical scenarios and had to
choose between a job with certain payment and a risky job. Based on their responses they
were classified in different categories. Individuals with the lowest risk tolerance (highest risk
aversion) were place in Category 1 and individuals with the highest risk tolerance (lowest risk
aversion) were place in Category 6. This survey was conducted in different waves, in particular
in the years 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2002. The relative shares of each group change very little
from wave to wave, exhibiting high persistence.
Figure A1.2: Distribution of Risk Tolerance


























Source: Own elaboration based on data from Kimball et al. (2008).
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Occupational Choice of Worker for Next Period
This figure displays the occupational choice for the next period made by workers, for different
values of risk aversion, occupation-specific ability and wealth holdings.

























Notes: This figure corresponds to Model II, where risk aversion is uniformly distributed.
Solid blue line: households with σ = 1; dashed red line: households with σ = 1.5; dash-dot




• Step 1: Construct a grid for asset holdings. The asset holdings interval is approximated
by a log-spaced grid with 1000 points, so that the grid is finer for low levels of assets. The
upper bound is set so that it is not binding for the household’s saving policy function.
• Step 2:: For a given interest rate, solve the optimization problem using value function
iteration.
• Step 3: To compute the invariant distribution use Monte Carlo simulation. Construct
sample of 100,000 households. Give the same level of initial assets to all of them. Assign
the combination of occupation-specific abilities (η, ε) according to the ergodic distribution
of the kronecker product of the transition matrices of both abilities, Γ = Γη ⊗ Γε. For
the initial occupation, assume that those households with high entrepreneurial ability are
entrepreneurs and those with low entrepreneurial ability are workers. Assign randomly
the (constant) level of risk aversion of each household, according to how it is distributed
in the population. Update the state variable of each household in the sample by using
the policy functions from step 2. For the next period occupation-specific abilities use a
random number generator. Because of randomness, the share of households with each
possible combination of abilities will not be equal to the ergodic share of Γ. Readjust
these shares accordingly. Compute the mean and standard deviation of asset holdings,
abilities and occupation. Iterate until the mean and standard deviation converge.
• Step 4: Compute the aggregate levels of capital (total asset holdings), entrepreneurial
labor and worker labor implied by the invariant distribution. Compute the capital and
(worker) labor demand of entrepreneurs. The capital and labor demand of the corporate
sector is the difference between the total supply and those of the entrepreneurial sector.
• Step 5: Compute the capital-labor ratio in the corporate sector and compare it with the
one implied by the interest rate guessed in step 2. If the difference is higher than 0.2%
update the interest rate guess. Repeat until convergence of the capital-labor ratio in the
corporate sector is reached.
28
2 — Long-term business relationships,
bargaining and monetary policy
2.1 Introduction
The typical business environment often differs dramatically from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition framework usually adopted in modern DSGE monetary models. As
evidenced by empirical research, most firms engage mainly in long-term relationships with their
customers, and most of their customers are other firms (see e.g. Blinder et al. (1998) for the
US, Fabiani et al. (2006) for the Euro Area and Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden). Most of these
long-term relationships are governed by implicit or explicit contracts, and these contracts last
on average between one and two years. Therefore, negotiations of prices and quantities are the
rule rather than the exception. In fact, in surveys firms report that the main reason they wish to
keep prices stable is that they are concerned about losing customer relationships. For instance,
Fabiani et al. (2006) find, on the basis of surveys conducted by nine Eurosystem national central
banks, that the existence of implicit and explicit contracts with customers is the most important
explanation for rigid prices. Zbaracki et al. (2004) find that customer communications and price
negotiation costs account for almost 75% of the total price adjustment cost and are 20 times
bigger than the size of the menu costs.
The repeated nature of the interactions between firms points toward an important issue:
bargained intermediate prices may not be allocative, in the sense that they may not affect the
final production of firms. For example, if the real intermediate price decreases, selling firms
may decide not to adjust production if they expect buyers to compensate them in the future
for the reduced profits incurred in the current period. In fact, as first shown by Barro (1977)
for the labor market, the real effects of monetary policy when prices are sticky crucially depend
on prices being allocative.1
1See also Abbritti and Trani (2017) for a discussion.
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Motivated by this literature, in this paper we introduce business-to-business (B2B) long-
term relationships and price bargaining into a standard monetary DSGE model. In the model
there are two types of firms, upstream producers (wholesalers) and downstream producers
(retailers). Wholesalers produce intermediate goods, which are transformed by retailers into
final goods and sold to households. The intermediate goods market is characterized by search
and matching frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Both wholesalers and retailers
need to spend time and resources to match and form long-term relationships with other firms.
Once a business relationship is formed, the price is bargained between wholesalers and retailers
according to a standard Nash bargaining protocol. In the future, this relationship will get de-
stroyed with a certain probability, which is endogenous to the model. In other words, the main
novelty is that the change in B2B relationships is determined by the model not only through
a process of endogenous creation, but also through the endogenous destruction of inefficient
matches. Lastly, the presence of quadratic intermediate-price adjustment costs introduce nom-
inal stickiness and gives a role to monetary policy, which is magnified by the existence of costly
search and matching with endogenous separation. The model provides a rigorous framework
to study the effect of long-term relationships and bargaining on monetary policy and business
cycle dynamics.
We highlight three main results. First, we show that the model, once calibrated to capture
the main structural features of the US product market, does a remarkably good job in repli-
cating the second moments and cross-correlations of the data, and that it improves over the
benchmark New Keynesian (NK) model in explaining some of them.2 In particular, introducing
B2B long-term relationships helps to improve the volatility of employment, intermediate prices
and core inflation as well as the cross-correlation of intermediate prices and core inflation with
output. It also provides better estimates for the cross-correlation of intermediate prices and
final-price inflation with core inflation.
Second, we find that the presence of long-term B2B relationships and bargaining strongly
affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks and the allocative power of the
bargained intermediate prices. In particular, we show that the real effects of monetary policy
are strictly related to the presence of an endogenous match destruction margin. If match
separations are exogenous, a monetary stimulus has a negligible effect on economic activity
- even though intermediate prices are sticky. On the contrary, if we allow for endogenous
separations of inefficient matches, intermediate prices recover some of their allocative power and
2To allow comparability between the two models, the benchmark New Keynesian model also has two sectors,
a wholesale and retail sector, and sticky intermediate prices
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positive monetary policy shocks lead to economic expansions. This happens because following
a monetary expansion, firms find it optimal to satisfy the increased demand by reducing the
endogenous separation rate and allowing more matches to survive.
Finally, we show that for a standard calibration of the product market, the effectiveness of
monetary policy in a model with B2B is significantly lower than in the benchmark NK model.
In particular, the real effects of an unexpected monetary policy shock are almost 40 percent
lower in the B2B model than in the NK model.
Recent research has started to investigate the importance of long-term relationships be-
tween firms and customers for price and business cycle dynamics. The vast majority of these
papers, however, focus on retail firms to consumers relationships, and do not allow for bilat-
eral negotiations between the parties.3 These are important distinctions, because the business
environment in B2B transactions is very different from the one in business-to-consumer (B2C)
transactions.
To the best of our knowledge, only three papers analyze the implications of B2B relation-
ships and bargaining for price and business cycle dynamics. Drozd and Nosal (2012) introduce
dynamic frictions of building market shares into an international real business cycle model and
show that the model can account for several pricing puzzles of international macroeconomics.
Mathä and Pierrard (2011) introduce two-sided search and matching between wholesalers and
retailers into the standard RBC model to study the effect of long-term relationships on business
cycle dynamics. Abbritti and Trani (2017) study incomplete pass-through and the allocative
power of intermediate goods prices in a model with product market frictions and bargaining
over intermediate prices and quantities.
Our paper differs from these three references in two main aspects: First, we endogenize
the match destruction margin. Following the model of Krause and Lubik (2007) for the labor
market, we assume that the productivity of each match is match-specific, and that inefficient
matches are destroyed. Second, we allow for price adjustment costs in the bargaining problem
between wholesalers and retailers. These costs, which are meant to capture customer com-
munications and price negotiation costs, introduce nominal price stickiness and give a role to
monetary policy. We show in the following that endogenous match destructions and sticky
prices potentially play an important role in B2B relationships, pricing dynamics and the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the theoretical B2B model.
3See, e.g, Hall (2008), Arseneau and Chugh (2007), Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009), Ravn et al. (2010),
Gourio and Rudanko (2014), Paciello et al. (2014), Den Haan (2013).
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Section 3 describes a two-sectors New Keynesian model that we use as a benchmark. In
Section 4 the calibration strategy is explained. Section 5 shows the main results of the paper
and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Firms and Product Market
The product market is composed by two different types of firms, wholesalers and retailers,
and follows the search and matching structure developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
In order to sell their products, wholesale producers need to establish long-term customer re-
lationships with retailers. Once both types of firms meet they bargain over the intermediate
price at which retailers buy intermediate goods from the wholesalers. The productivity of firms
is match-specific and has both an aggregate component and an idiosyncratic one, which we
denote as at(i) and is drawn from a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f. F (at (i)) and p.d.f.
f (at (i)). We assume that the aggregate number of business to business (B2B) relationships
Tt, follows the law of motion Tt+1 = (1− δt+1) (Tt +mt) where mt, the number of new B2B
relationships at time t, is a constant returns to scale function of the search effort of retailers






The separation rate is defined as δt = δx + (1− δx)F (ãt (i)), where ãt (i) is an endogenously
determined productivity threshold below which matches are not profitable and hence termi-
nated.
Wholesalers
There is a continuum of wholesale producers with unit mass. Each wholesaler j maximizes the










Tt (j)− (rt + δk)Kt(j)− wtNt (j)− γWSt (j)
}
,
subject to the production function




with q being the quantity produced per match, and the law of motion of the customer base
Tt (j) = (1− δt (j)) (Tt−1 (j) + St−1 (j)µW (θt−1)) .
The term βt,t+1 = β (Ct+1/Ct)
−σ denotes the household’s stochastic discount factor, while γWSt
denotes the search costs. Intuitively, the wholesaler chooses how much search effort, St, he will
execute to find new buyers for his product. Think of this as the firm choosing the number
of sales managers it is going to hire.4 Each unit of effort will provide him with an average of
µW (θt) = m̃θ
(1−ξ)
t retailers at the end of the period, where θt = Vt/St is the product market
tightness. PIt (j) denotes the price of the intermediate good, that is decided after the successful




captures quadratic price adjustment costs. We assume that this cost, which is intended to
capture price negotiation and communication costs, is proportional to the number of B2B
relationships Tt.
The wholesaler also decides how much capital, Kt (j), and labor, Nt (j), he is going to rent.
At is an AR(1) TFP shock and, for simplicity, we normalize q = 1. The real rate of interest is
rt, the depreciation rate of capital is δk and the real wage is denoted by wt = Wt/Pt.



















are equal across wholesalers. This is because ex-ante all the wholesale producers are identi-
cal since the match-specific productivity draws are not realized until the matches occur and
intermediate prices are bargained.




− cWt (j)−mct + Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1 (j)) JWt+1 (j) (2.2)
This equation captures the expected value (across matches) of a B2B relationship for wholesaler
j. This depends positively on the intermediate price that the retailer pays him and negatively
on the marginal cost of production. The last term, Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1 (j)) JWt+1, captures the
4See Gourio and Rudanko (2014).
33
expected continuation value of a match. This brings dynamic effects into the model coming
from the fact that in the next period only a fraction equal to (1− δt+1 (j)) of the matches
survives and both wholesalers and retailers benefit from them.
The optimal amount of search is chosen to equate the expected marginal cost and the
marginal benefit of a new business relationship:
γW
µW (θt)
= Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1 (j)) JWt+1 (j) (2.3)
This equation makes it clear that the search effort is executed in one period but it does not
pay off until the next period and only if the match resulting from it is not destroyed.
Retailers
There is a continuum of retail producers with unit mass that buy the intermediate goods from
wholesalers and sell it to consumers in perfectly competitive markets. Each retailer draws a
match-specific productivity from a time-invariant distribution with c.d.f. F (a) and p.d.f. f(a).
We assume that the draw of productivity takes place after intermediate price bargaining. This
timing assumption simplifies considerably the bargaining problem and the solution of the model
because it implies that the bargained price is identical for every match. The total production







da = Tt (i)H (ãt (i))
where Tt (i) is the number of productive or functional matches and H (ãt (i)) is the conditional
expectation of the idiosyncratic shock E [a | a ≥ ãt (i)]. The productivity threshold ãt (i) is
endogenously determined such that below it matches are not profitable and hence destroyed.
In a similar way to the case of the wholesale producers, the number of B2B relationships of
retailer i follows a law of motion that depends on the current-period separation rate and the
previous-period number of functional matches and search effort exercised, Vt−1 (i)
Tt (i) = (1− δt (i)) (Tt−1 (i) + Vt−1 (i)µR (θt−1))
where µR (θt) = m̃θ
−ξ
t is the average number of wholesalers attracted in the current period per
unit of effort.
Retailers maximize the expected present value of profits before the realization of the id-
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iosyncratic shock a, i.e. based on the expected output EaY Rt (i) = Tt (i)H (ãit). Specifically,












Tt (i)− γRVt (i)
}
subject to the law of motion of the customer base. Retailers also face a cost of changing the
bargained price, which is defined as cRt =
φR
2
(PIt(i)/PIt−1(i)− πI)2 and it is also proportional
to the number of B2B relationships Tt (i). The last term of the equation captures the cost of
search effort.
At the beginning of each period the retailer chooses the level of production and the search
effort. The intermediate price PIt is decided after the successful match in a bilateral bargaining
between retailers and wholesalers.
From the first-order necessary conditions we get the expected value (across matches) of a
customer relationship for the retailer






+ Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1 (i)) JRt+1 (i) (2.4)
The value of a match depends positively on its production and negatively on the marginal
cost, which is the relative price the retailer has to pay to the wholesaler. Similar to the case
of the wholesaler, the last term in the equation connects the value of the matches in two
subsequent periods bringing the dynamic effects into the model. Although (most) variables
are connected in general equilibrium, we can notice a ceteris paribus effect of the threshold on
the value of the matches. In particular, a higher threshold implies a higher average value of
the matches because the previously least productive matches are destroyed, leaving operative
those with higher productivity.
In equilibrium, the expected cost of a new match in a given period equals the expected
marginal benefit that will be realized in the subsequent periods:
γR
µR (θt)
= Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1 (i)) JRt+1 (i) (2.5)
Endogenous separation
We assume that a successful match is endogenously destroyed whenever the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock does not make it profitable for at least one of the parties. Since prices are




does not depend on the idiosynchratic productivity of a match at, which affects only retailers.
Let us define by JRt (at) the marginal value for the retailer of a match with idiosyncratic
productivity at. The threshold ãt is endogenously determined as solution of J
R
t (ãt) = 0.
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Combining this equation with the first-order conditions of the retailer the critical threshold










The threshold ãt is increasing on the relative intermediate price and on the cost of changing
prices because the higher these are the more profitable the match has to be to allow the retailer
to pay for them.
Bargaining
After wholesalers and retailers are matched, intermediate prices are determined through a Nash
bargaining scheme between them. Precisely, for each match v, intermediate goods prices are









where η is the bargaining power of wholesalers.
We assume that prices are determined before the productivity draw of the retailers. Hence,
the bargaining problem is the same across matches and the intermediate price will be unique.
Let us denote by ϕt =
PIt
Pt











= (1− η) τRt JWt + ητWt JRt (2.7)
where
τWt = φW (πIt − 1) πIt − Etβt,t+1
[
(1− δt+1(j))φW + (1− δx)f(ãt+1)JWt+1φR
]
(πIt+1 − 1)πIt+1















+ (1− δx)f (ãt+1(i)) JRt+1(i)
]
φR (πIt+1 − 1) πIt+1
}
capture the marginal costs of changing the intermediate price for the wholesalers and the
retailers respectively.
Notice that if prices were flexible we would have τWt = τ
R
t = 0 and equation (2.7) would
resemble the standard solution by which each party gets a share of the surplus equal to their
bargaining power:






The main difference from a standard solution is the presence of the term ∂H(ãt)
∂ãt
, which
enters the bargaining solution because firms internalize the fact that a higher bargained price
leads retailers to increase the endogenous separation threshold and the average productivity of
a match.
2.2.2 Households













which depends positively on consumption, ct, and negatively on labor, Nt. The household




πt+1 + It = wtNt + bt + (rt + δk)Kt + dt (2.9)










where bt denote purchases of bonds, Rt is the nominal interest rate on bonds, wt is the real
wage and dt are the dividends net of lump sum taxes.
From the first-order necessary conditions we obtain the standard Euler Equation, the labor
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Where Qt denotes Tobin’s Q. These equations will determine the level of consumption, the
demand for bonds and physical capital and the supply of labor.
2.2.3 Aggregate Constraints and Prices
To close the model we need to aggregate the quantities and the markets to clear. The to-
tal output in the economy is the result of adding up the production of every match whose
productivity draw was above the threshold:







And finally notice that output can be either consumed, invested in physical capital or used
to pay the cost of changing bargained prices and/or search efforts.
Yt = ct + It + φ (πIt − 1)2 Tt + γRVt + γWSt
where φ = φR + φW .
From the definition of the relative price, ϕt = PIt/Pt, we are able to establish the relation-








The monetary policy is described by a simple Taylor-type rule where the nominal interest













where φR, φπI and φY are the relative weights on the previous period interest rate, current
core (intermediate price) inflation and output growth, respectively, and zt denotes an i.i.d.
monetary policy shock.
2.3 A Benchmark Two-Sectors New Keynesian Model
To validate the importance of our contribution, we compare the results of our product market
frictions (B2B) model with the ones of a benchmark New Keynesian (NK) model with monop-
olistic competition. To make the models comparable, we assume that in the benchmark model
there are also two sectors of production, wholesalers and retailers. Wholesalers are monopolis-
tically competitive and face quadratic price adjustment costs. Retailers combine the varieties
of the intermediate goods in a single bundle and sell it to households.
Specifically, in the benchmark NK model retailers operate under perfect competition and









is a bundle of intermediate varieties bought from different wholesalers. The optimal demand

















Notice that this cost function is identical to the one faced by wholesalers and retailers in the
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subject to the production function yIt (j) = AtKt(j)
αNt (j)
1−α and the demand for each variety


































τPt(j) = ψp (πIt (j)− π)πIt (j)− βt,t+1
yIt+1 (j)
yIt (j)
{ψp (πIt+1 (j)− π) πIt+1 (j)}
denotes the marginal costs of changing prices. The first two equations capture the marginal
costs and the capital-labor ratio. Equation (2.18) is instead a version of the Phillips curve
relating present and future inflation rates to marginal costs. In fact, aggregating across firms
and log-linearizing around the steady state one can rewrite equation (2.18) as:




where variables with hats denote log deviations from the steady state.
Importantly, the presence of sticky prices is not sufficient to generate intermediate price
variability in the NK model. Notice in fact that in a symmetric equilibrium, equation (2.15)
implies that the relative intermediate price is constant and equal to 1, ϕt =
PIt
Pt
= 1, and that
PPI and CPI inflation are identical:
π̂It = π̂t
2.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model at the quarterly frequency, so we set the discount factor β = 0.99 to
match a standard annualized interest rate of 4%. We use standard values also for the share of
capital in production and the rate of capital depreciation. These are, respectively, α = 0.33
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and δk = 0.025.
Our calibration of the search and matching with bargaining follows largely the strategy de-
veloped by Abbritti and Trani (2017). This is based on survey interviews to business managers
from various sectors of the U.S. economy and on survey data on employment in sales-related
activities. Given the average opinion of business managers, the most reasonable average dura-
tion of firm-to-firm relationships is between 1 and 2 years. This sets a target for the quarterly
separation rate, which we calibrate to δ = 0.20. The labor search literature has assumed that
the exogenous component explains the most of the separation rate. For example, in Krause
and Lubik (2007), the exogenous component is 3/4 of the overall separation rate. Here we
adopt a more conservative approach and assume that δx = 0.60δ, which in turn implies that
the endogenous component is δn = F (ã) = 0.40δ/ [1− 0.60δ]. By assumption, F (ã) is a log-
normal distribution. We normalize its mean, so that µLN = 1, and set its volatility σLN to
0.175. Consequently, ã is equal to 0.78.
According to the evidence on sales-related activities, wholesalers’ search S is 9% of inter-
mediate goods output. Since in this model the volume of trade between firms coincides with
the number of matches (i.e., there is only an extensive margin of trade), this means that whole-
salers’ search is close to 9% of GDP. This target allows us to determine both the search cost
parameter and the matching efficiency. Therefore, assuming η = ξ = 0.5, we obtain γ = 0.5726
and m̃ = 2.8497. The main justification for a conservative parametrization of the bargaining
power η and elasticity of matching ξ is that there is no useful evidence for choosing them,
so, setting them to 0.5, we can better relate our results to the endogenous separation of the
matches and the other new features of the model.6
We then set the time spent producing goods N to 0.2, which implies that working time
represents 20% of the total available time (see Mathä and Pierrard (2011)). Together with the
elasticity of labor supply, this pins down the labor disutility κ. We choose a labor elasticity
equal to 1.6 by setting ν = 0.625, which is broadly consistent with macroeconomic estimates
(restated recently by Peterman (2016)). Regarding the calibration of the quadratic price ad-
justment costs, we follow Krause and Lubik (2007), who introduce one-sided price rigidity and
calibrate its parameter to a value of 40. Since in our model (B2B) there is two-sided price
rigidity, we equally distribute the price rigidity between both sides and set the parameters
governing the degree of price rigidities to φW = φR = 20.
6In a model that abstracts from nominal price rigidity and endogenous destruction, Abbritti and Trani
(2017) show that one can choose η to approximate the volatility of the PPI in the data, with little consequence
for the other moments.
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Lastly, we describe our strategy for calibrating the monetary policy and the TFP shocks.
We assume that the strength of the reaction of the Central Bank to core inflation is φπI = 1.5
and to output growth is φY = 0.5/4. The persistence of the interest rates is φR = 0.85. The
standard deviation of monetary policy shocks is set to the standard value of 0.1%. As far as the
TFP shocks are concerned, we assume that their persistence is 0.9 and choose their volatility
to match the volatility of U.S. GDP. The implied value is σA = 0.975% . Conditional on these
choices, we control the relative volatility of investment using the parameter φI which is set
equal to 0.215 in our model.
To understand the role of long term B2B relationships and bargaining for business cycle
dynamics, it will be instructive to compare the dynamics of B2B model with the ones of the
benchmark NK model. To facilitate comparison, the calibration of the benchmark NK model
is identical to the one of the B2B model. Specifically, to calibrate the degree of price rigidity
in the NK model we have followed Krause and Lubik (2007) and set ψp = 40, which is equal
to the sum of the price adjustment costs for wholesalers and retailers. The only additional
parameter that we need to specify is the elasticity of demand εNK , which we set to 6 as, e.g.,
in Blanchard and Gaĺı (2010).
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Steady State Analysis
In order to understand the role and the contribution of the endogenous separation rate, in this
section we analyze the steady states of our model with and without endogenous separation
rate, for different values of the bargaining power. The model with exogenous separation rate is
obtained by simply setting to zero the variance of the match-specific productivity and keeping
all the other parameters fixed at their baseline values.7 Specifically, we compare steady-state
equilibria for the following three values of the bargaining power of wholesalers: 0.3, 0.5, and
0.7. The results can be seen in Table 2.1, where the last column displays the ratio of the
final price to total marginal cost, which is introduced as an approximation to the mark-up of
producers.8
Considering that the model with endogenous separation is our baseline assumption, as well
7When σLN is exactly equal to zero, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivities is degenerate and its
c.d.f. evaluated at the threshold is also zero. Then, the separation rate becomes completely exogenous.
8The total marginal cost is computed as the ratio of wholesalers marginal cost to the average productivity
of matches, i.e. χ = mc/H(ã).
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Table 2.1: Steady State Analysis
T θ H(ã) Y δ mc P/χ
B2B Baseline
η = 0.3 0.5832 2.3137 1.0034 0.5852 0.1276 0.9343 1.0740
η = 0.5 0.5795 0.9552 1.0281 0.5958 0.2004 0.9222 1.1148
η = 0.7 0.5491 0.3930 1.0705 0.5878 0.3430 0.8305 1.2890
B2B with Exogenous Separation
η = 0.3 0.5835 2.3333 1.0000 0.5835 0.1200 0.9352 1.0693
η = 0.5 0.5854 1.0000 1.0000 0.5854 0.1200 0.9406 1.0632
η = 0.7 0.5835 0.4286 1.0000 0.5835 0.1200 0.9352 1.0693
as our main contribution, let us start by analyzing its steady state. Since η measures the
bargaining power of wholesalers it affects the share of the total surplus of a match that these
retain. In particular, the higher it is, the higher the value of a match for wholesalers, and
the more they will search. The opposite is true for retailers and this is what explains the
observed values of the product market tightness, θ, which is defined as the ratio of the search
effort of retailers to that of wholesalers. However, as we can see from equation (2.8), η is not
the only determinant of the solution to the bargaining problem.9 Actually, the (endogenous)
productivity threshold, ã, below which a match is terminated also affects how its surplus is
shared between wholesalers and retailers. Intuitively, the fact that retailers have a direct control
of the separation rate provides them with additional leverage on the bargaining problem.10
Through this additional wedge, retailers are partially compensated for bearing most of the risk
of an adverse realization of the idiosyncratic shock. This allows us to differentiate between
the “bargaining power”, which is exogenous and is fully captured by the parameter η, and
the“effective bargaining power”, which is endogenous and is jointly determined by η and ã. In
other words, whereas retailers can affect the number of B2B relations both through their search
effort and the decision to separate (or not), wholesalers can only adjust through their search
effort. This is the reason behind the negative relationship between η and the number of B2B
relationships, T , which is driven by the fact that the lower the bargaining power of retailers
the more they choose to separate. However, the matches being destroyed are the ones with
lower productivity, which increases the average productivity of matches in the economy, H(ã).
This increase in average productivity implies a reduction in the marginal cost of wholesalers,
which further reduces the total marginal cost and significantly increases the approximation of
9Notice that equation (2.8) is the solution to the bargaining problem with flexible prices, so by simply
removing the time subindices we obtain the solution to the bargaining problem is steady state for the baseline
model (i.e. with sticky prices).
10The retailer is the one drawing the match-specific productivity and deciding whether a match survives or
is terminated. Remember that the threshold below which matches are terminated is such that the marginal
value of a match for a retailer is zero.
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the mark-up of wholesalers, P/χ.
Next, let us analyze what happens to the steady-state equilibria with exogenous separation
rate. If retailers cannot decide to terminate a B2B relationship, the term with ã in equation
(2.8) disappears and we obtain the standard solution to the Nash bargaining problem where
only the bargaining power, η, determines how the surplus of a match is shared between both
parties. In this case, for the baseline calibration (i.e. η = 0.5), the Hosios (1990) condition is
satisfied and the solution to the bargaining problem is constrained efficient. However, notice
that while the number of B2B relationships is lower in the model with endogenous separation
than in the model with exogenous separation, total production is higher in the former (for
the same value of η). This is explained by the fact that the matches being destroyed in the
model with endogenous separation are those with lowest productivity whereas in the exoge-
nous separation model all the matches are equally productive. Another important difference
between both model specifications is that in the model with exogenous separation rate differ-
ent calibrations of the bargaining power do not seem to significantly affect the steady state
values. Furthermore, it can be seen that its effect is symmetric. For example, output follows
a symmetric inverse-U shape for different values of η, and it is maximized when wholesalers
and retailers held the same bargaining power. This happens because wholesalers and retail-
ers can only affect the number of B2B relationships through their search effort and, for this
calibration, the search externality is fully internalized. This is not the case in the model with
endogenous separation and η equal to 0.5, where the search externality is not fully internalized
by producers, which leads to a congestion problem and hence the value of output is not the
maximum possible. The nonlinear and symmetric behavior is also observed for the number
of B2B relations T , the marginal cost of wholesalers, mc, and therefore in the approximate
mark-up, P/χ, as well. Therefore, the results from this analysis indicate that the endogenous
separation rate plays an important role in the steady-state equilibrium of the model and is
a potential source of asymmetries that might be important for the transmission of different
shocks.11
2.5.2 Second Moments
To assess the quantitative validity of our model, Table 2.2 shows selected second moments
of different versions of the model and compare them with the ones of the U.S. data and the
benchmark NK model. The data are collected from FRED and cover the period from 1975Q1
11See sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 for an analysis of the contribution of the endogenous separation rate on the
transmission of technology and monetary policy shocks.
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to 2015Q2.12 The simulations of the various economies, except for the one in the last column
of the table, are instead based on the preferred calibration of our model, which is the case of
the B2B model displayed in column B2B(I).
The B2B model with endogenous separations, column B2B(I), does a fairly good job in
replicating most second moment statistics of the data. Specifically, it captures the relative
volatilities of employment and intermediate prices, and the cross-correlations of most variables
with GDP and PPI inflation. The model instead fails to match the relative volatility and cross-
correlation of CPI inflation. This can be explained by the fact that, to clarify the mechanism
of the model, we have assumed that retail prices are perfectly flexible.
Table 2.2: Second Moments
Data B2B (I) B2B (II) NK (I) NK (II)
Volatility GDP 1.39 1.39 1.39 1.36 1.39
Vol(x)/Vol(GDP)
Investment 3.49 3.49 3.36 5.87 3.49
Employment 0.96 0.84 1.19 0.62 0.66
Wages 0.42 0.93 1.23 0.84 0.87
Interm. Price 0.40 0.37 0.63 0.00 0.00
CPI Inflation 0.20 0.53 0.89 0.26 0.33
PPI Inflation 0.33 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.33
Corr(x, GDP)
Investment 0.89 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.87
Employment 0.85 0.56 0.57 0.44 -0.07
Wages 0.85 0.73 0.70 0.92 0.92
Interm. Price 0.22 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.00
CPI Inflation 0.43 -0.20 -0.35 -0.01 -0.23
PPI Inflation 0.25 0.21 0.26 -0.01 -0.23
Corr(x,PPI Infl.)
Interm. Price 0.28 0.40 0.31 0.00 0.00
CPI Inflation 0.25 0.08 -0.04 1.00 1.00
Notes: B2B (I) denotes the baseline model specification with endogenous sepa-
ration rate. B2B (II) is the model specification with exogenous separation rate
(computed by setting to zero the variance of the match-specific productivity). NK
(I) denotes the benchmark New Keynesian model with the same calibration as
the B2B model. NK (II) denotes the benchmark New Keynesian model with an
alternative calibration that sets the investment adjustment costs and the standard
deviation of TFP shocks to match output volatility and the relative investment
volatility.
Column B2B(II) shows the results of a nested B2B model with an exogenous separation rate.
A comparison between the two models reveals that closing down the match destruction margin
strongly increases the relative volatilities of employment, wages, real intermediate prices and
12For the intermediate price we use “PPI Final Demand Finished Goods Less Energy” and for the final price
we use “CPI All Goods Less Energy”.
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CPI inflation, while the volatility of output is not affected. The B2B model with endogenous
separations also provides a better fit of the cross-correlation of PPI inflation with intermediate
prices and CPI inflation. Overall, the fact that the B2B model with endogenous separation rate
provides a better match of the relative volatility of the intermediate price suggests that allowing
firms to decide whether they want to continue with a business relationship has important effects
on price dynamics.
To provide a deeper understanding of the role of the endogenous separation rate, we com-
pare the dynamics of models B2B(I) and B2B (II) following a TFP shock (see Figure B2.1 in
Appendix). A positive TFP shock makes wholesalers more productive, increasing total produc-
tion. In the B2B(I) model, the increase in the number of business relationships comes from two
different sources. On one hand, the reduction of wholesalers’ marginal costs increases the total
value of each match and induces both wholesalers and retailers to increase their search efforts,
which results in the creation of a higher number of matches. On the other hand, the threshold
of the idiosyncratic productivity below which matches are destroyed declines, bringing down
both the endogenous separation rate and the average productivity of matches. The high per-
sistence of output is mainly driven by the high persistence of the number of B2B relationships,
while the endogenous separation margin mainly affects the short-run response of output and
B2B relationships. Overall, the shock reduces wholesalers’ marginal costs and leads to lower
relative intermediate prices and PPI inflation. Closing down the endogenous separation rate
mainly affects the short-run ability of firms to adjust to the technology shock. In the B2B(II)
model, since firms can adjust production only through the match creation margin, the reac-
tion of search efforts, employment and intermediate prices are amplified, while the short-run
response of production and the number of matches is reduced. The next section elaborates
more on the contribution and importance of the endogenous separation rate of matches and
how it shapes the transmission of monetary policy.
The second moments of the B2B model differ significantly from the ones of the benchmark
New Keynesian model (see column NK (I) in Table 2.2). Adopting exactly the same calibration,
the NK model generates similar volatility of output but a much higher volatility of investment.
More importantly, as we mentioned before, the presence of sticky intermediate prices is not
sufficient to generate intermediate price variability in the NK model, and implies a one to
one relationship between PPI and CPI inflation. As a consequence, the relative volatility and
cross correlation of intermediate prices are 0, and the relative volatilities and cross-correlations
of PPI and CPI inflation with output are identical. In other words, the B2B model fits the
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data at least as well as the NK model, and this is not an artifact of an advantageous calibra-
tion. Indeed, column NK (II) shows the results of re-calibrating the NK model using the same
calibration strategy as the B2B model. In particular, we reset the standard deviation of tech-
nology shocks and the investment adjustment costs of the NK model to match the U.S. output
volatility and relative volatility of investment.13 The fit of the NK model improves for what
concerns investment, employment, CPI and PPI inflation volatility, but the cross-correlations
of employment, CPI and PPI investment worsen and are even more counterfactually negative
than in column NK(I).
Once again, we believe that it is interesting to compare the dynamics of the economy under
the B2B and NK model following a TFP shock. In particular, we perform this comparison using
the calibrations B2B(I) and NK (I) and obtain the results in Figure B2.2 of the Appendix.
Our findings show that the presence of product market frictions and bargaining reduces the
responses of investment, wages and PPI inflation, but amplifies the ones of employment and
production, which is in line with intuition obtained from the second moments.
2.5.3 The Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks
In this section we show that the presence of long-term business relationships and bargaining
crucially determines both the real effects of monetary policy as well as its transmission mecha-
nism. In our baseline model, the number of B2B relationships, and therefore overall production,
changes through both the endogenous destruction and endogenous creation of matches. This
implies that the presence of sticky intermediate prices can in principle affect production through
both channels. On one hand, changes in the relative intermediate price have a direct effect
on the separation threshold. By looking at equation (2.6) it can be seen that a lower relative
intermediate price decreases the separation threshold, ã. Therefore, both the separation rate
and the average productivity of surviving matches decrease. Through this mechanism, inter-
mediate prices have a direct allocative role on the number of B2B relationships and hence on
final output. This implies that, in the presence of sticky prices, monetary policy can directly
affect the number of endogenous separations, the average productivity of surviving business
relationships and final and intermediate output.
On the other hand, the intermediate price also affects the value of a B2B relationship
to wholesalers and retailers, modifying their incentives to engage in costly search activities.
Moreover, it is straightforward to see from equations (2.2) and (2.4), that the change in the
13The implied parameters for the NK model are σA = 1.28% and φI = 1.92.
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value of a match and hence in incentives is opposite across the two sides of the market: while a
decrease in the relative intermediate price induces wholesalers to decrease their search effort, it
also increases the search effort of retailers. In the end, the two effects tend to cancel out. The
overall effect on the formation of new matches depends on the initial product market tightness,
on the presence of search externalities and on the separation rate.
Figure 2.1: Comparison of the IRFs of the B2B Model With and Without Endogenous Separation



























































To gauge the relative size of these two channels, Figure 2.1 compares the effects of an ex-
pansionary monetary policy shock in our model with endogenous separation rate and the same
model but with exogenous separation rate. Let us consider first the model with endogenous
separation. The monetary policy shock, which corresponds to a 0.25 percent reduction of the
nominal interest rate, stimulates the economy increasing the levels of consumption and invest-
ment, and therefore aggregate demand. As a result, final and intermediate prices increase.
However, since price rigidity occurs in the intermediate level, the final price increases more
than the intermediate price and hence the relative intermediate price goes down. As previ-
ously explained, this change in the intermediate price leads to a decrease in the separation
threshold which reduces the separation rate and increases the number of matches. In other
48
words, to satisfy the increase in aggregate demand retail firms increase their production ad-
justing through the endogenous separation margin, that is by keeping alive matches with lower
productivity. Nevertheless, wholesalers and retailers are aware of the transient nature of the
shock and, anticipating the need to reduce their stock of B2B relationships in the future, both
reduce their search effort. The overall effect is a short-lived increase in production and in the
number of matches, which goes hand in hand with a reduction of the average productivity of
matches.
A completely different pattern is observed when firms are not allowed to adjust production
through the endogenous separation of inefficient matches. As before, the monetary policy
shock leads to an increase in aggregate demand and a reduction of the relative intermediate
price. Consequently, the value of a match for a wholesaler decreases, whereas that of the
retailer increases. Accordingly, the change in search effort of retailers is positive whereas in
the model with endogenous separation it was negative. This is key because it reveals the
different transmission mechanisms of monetary policy between both models. The differences
arising from the endogenous separation also imply that there is an endogenous response of the
effective bargaining power. In the end, in the model with exogenous separation, the opposite
effects in searching effort of wholesalers and retailers cancel out and there is no change at all
neither in production nor on the number of B2B relationships. Actually, there is no change
in any other real variable except for search effort. This implies that intermediate prices have
(almost) no allocative role for output dynamics along the endogenous match creation margin,
and monetary policy shocks have negligible real effects in a model with exogenous separations.
This analysis suggests that monetary policy shocks can still have real effects on output and
consumption dynamics, but that these effects work almost entirely through the endogenous
separation margin. But how big are these real effects? To answer this question, Figure 2.2
compares the effects of an unexpected monetary shock in the baseline B2B model with the
ones in the B2B model with exogenous separation, the B2B model with endogenous separation
and η = 0.7, and the benchmark NK model.
The comparison between the baseline B2B model (η = 0.5) and the same model with
η = 0.7 is aimed at complementing the discussion provided in section 2.5.1 about the effect of
the bargaining power on the equilibrium of the model. In particular we want to see how much
the allocative role of prices changes with different values of η.14 The first aspect we notice is
14We do not include a comparison with the baseline B2B with η = 0.3 because that calibration will provide
too much bargaining power to retailers, considering that they are the ones deciding if a match should be
destroyed or not.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of the IRFs of the B2B and NK Models to a Monetary Policy Shock
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B2B Endog.  but =0.7
NK Model
that, on impact, the effect of monetary policy on output is almost the same in both models.
However, we observe that the shock is more persistent for the higher value of the bargaining
power of wholesalers. This higher persistence is shared in other variables such as investment,
employment and wages. Furthermore, the effect of a monetary policy shock on investment is
twice as high on impact in the model with η = 0.7. This can be explained by the fact that now
retailers have less bargaining power and therefore the endogenous separation margin (which is
solely controlled by them) becomes more important and has a greater effect on the dynamics of
the model. In other words, the real effects of monetary policy are increasing in the bargaining
power of wholesalers.
Comparing both versions of the baseline B2B and the NK models we see that the effects
of a monetary policy shock are qualitatively similar but quantitatively rather different. Most
notably, while the responses of PPI and CPI inflation in the three models resemble each other,
the responses of output, investment and employment are significantly larger - and more persis-
tent - in the NK model than in the baseline B2B model. Overall, notwithstanding the relatively
generous calibration of the endogenous separation margin, the real effects of monetary policy
shocks on output dynamics are 40 percent smaller in the latter model than in the NK model.
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This is consistent with the idea of a lower allocative role of intermediate prices in B2B rela-
tionships. However, notice that the real effects of monetary policy increase in the B2B model
if the bargaining power of wholesalers is increased. Even though, on impact, the response of
output and employment is lower in the B2B model with η = 0.7 than in the NK model, the
effect of the monetary policy shock is more persistent in the former. The higher persistence
B2B model with η = 0.7 is also observed in investment and wages which, on top of that, have
a higher response on impact than the NK model. As explained above, the reason behind this
is the increased use of the endogenous separation margin made by retailers as a response to
their reduction in bargaining power.
2.6 Conclusions
A growing empirical literature shows that most transactions are firm-to-firm and that price
rigidities mainly arise at the intermediate goods level, in relationships governed by implicit
or explicit long-term contracts. This paper studies theoretically the implications of long-term
business relationships and bargaining over sticky prices for monetary policy and business cycles
dynamics. To this aim, it introduces search and matching frictions, endogenous separations
and bargaining between firms into an otherwise standard monetary DSGE model. The different
business environment has important effects on monetary policy and business cycle dynamics.
The model outperforms the benchmark New Keynesian model in replicating some of the second
moments and cross-correlations of US product market and business cycle data. We show
that, in the presence of long-term business relationships and bargaining, monetary policy is
less effective. This happens because, for standard calibrations, the long-term nature of the
relationships between firms reduces the allocative role of intermediate good prices and the real




Intermediate prices are determined through a Nash bargaining scheme between the retailer and
the wholesaler. Precisely, for each match v, intermediate goods prices are determined as the









where η is the bargaining power of retailers.













− Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1(i)) JRt+1(i)
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(A2.1)





































































































































































































−mct + Etβt,t+1 (1− δt+1(j)) JWt+1(j)
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ϕt − φW (πIt − 1) πIt
+Etβt,t+1 [(1− δt+1)φW
+ (1− δx)f (ãt+1) JWt+1φR
]
(πIt+1 − 1) πIt+1
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ϕt = (1− η) τRt JWt + ητWt JRt
where
τWt = φW (πIt − 1)πIt − Etβt,t+1
[
(1− δt+1)φW + (1− δx)f (ãt+1) JWt+1φR
]
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The Role of Technology Shocks
Figure B2.1: Comparison of the IRFs of the B2B Model With and Without Endogenous Separa-































































Figure B2.2: Comparison of the IRFs of the B2B and NK Models to a Technology Shock







































3 — On Staggered Prices and Opti-
mal Inflation
3.1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to calculate the optimal rate of inflation in economies with mo-
nopolistic competition and sticky prices. On that purpose, two types of slow price-adjustment
specifications will be introduced in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive framework:
the Taylor (1980) staggered prices, and the Calvo (1983) partial adjustment based on fixed
probabilities. Together they represent the bulk of recent literature on optimizing models with
sticky prices.1,2
We compute the optimal monetary policy by finding the inflation rate that maximizes
welfare in steady state. Intuitively, our optimality analysis is based on the steady-state link
between inflation and the mark-up of prices over the marginal cost of production. This mark-
up is recognized as a source of economic inefficiency that stems from monopolistic competition
models.3 Therefore, the rate of inflation that maximizes the utility of the representative indi-
vidual in the economy is also the one that minimizes the mark-up in steady state. This becomes
the optimal rate of inflation when abstracting from other channels for long-run effects. Nei-
ther price indexation nor transactions-facilitating money (shoe-leather costs) will feature in
the analysis in order to isolate the steady-state effects of combining monopolistic competition
with sticky prices.4 These assumptions may be acceptable in economies with low and stable
1Examples of papers using Calvo model are Yun (1996), King and Wolman (1996), Erceg et al. (2000), and
Sbordone (2002). The Taylor model has been employed by in King and Wolman (1999), Chari et al. (2000),
and Huang and Liu (2002).
2One alternative way of introducing price rigidity in models with monopolistic competition is by assuming
an adjustment cost of price changes as in Rotemberg (1982). One example is Faia (2008), who also computes
the optimal monetary policy and finds similar results to the ones obtained in this paper.
3It results in some welfare loss relative to the price-taking behavior of perfect competition as first pointed
out by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Other papers that examine this issue are King and Wolman (1996,
1999) and Khan et al. (2003).
4See Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Lucas (2000), and Khan et al. (2003) for the welfare analysis of inflation
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inflation.5
We find that the optimal rate of inflation in steady state is positive because it reduces the
monopolistic competition distortions, minimizing the mark-up and hence maximizing welfare.
This result is robust for different schemes and degrees of price stickiness. Moreover, the optimal
rate of inflation is approximately equal to the ratio between the rate of discount and the Dixit-
Stiglitz elasticity.
Finally, we document that even though the welfare cost of steady-state inflation is quanti-
tatively small, it is significantly higher if prices are sticky à la Calvo than à la Taylor.
3.2 A Model With Monopolistic Competition and Sticky
Prices
3.2.1 Households
There is a representative household in the economy who, in period t, seeks to maximize his












where Et is the rational expectation operator in period t, β = 1/(1 + ρ) is the discount factor,
with ρ > 0 as the household discount rate. The preference parameters are strictly positive,
σ, γ, ϕ > 0. Household utility depends positively on consumption, ct+j, and negatively on
labor, nt+j.
6 The household faces a sequence of flow budget constraints which, denoted in real
terms for a given period t, can be written as:
wtnt + r
k
t kt + dt = ct + kt+1 − (1− δ) kt + (1 + rt)
−1 bt+1 − bt
where kt+1 and bt+1 denote purchases of physical capital and bonds, respectively, and 0 < δ < 1
is the constant rate of capital depreciation. Accordingly, rkt and rt are the real returns on capital
and bonds. The real wage is wt, and dt are firm dividends.
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to consumption, bonds, physical capital
in models with transactions-facilitating money, and Casares (2004) when there is price indexation.
5From 1995 to 2018, the average rate of inflation in the US has been 1.89% per year, whereas in the Euro
Area it has been 1.53% per year.










and labor supply are
c−σt − λt = 0
−λt (1 + rt)−1 + βEtλt+1 = 0
−λt + βEtλt+1(1− δ + rkt+1) = 0
−ϕnγt + λtwt = 0
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.
3.2.2 Producers
We begin with the monopolistic competition setup described in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There
is a continuum of firms each producing a differentiated good and selling it in a monopolistically
competitive market. Thus, the firm i sets the price Pt(i) in quarter t, and the amount of output







where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, Pt is the aggregate
price level, and yt is aggregate output. Regardless of the price-adjustment specification, in
every period firms choose capital and labor to minimize the cost of production:
rkt kt(i) + wtnt(i)
subject to the Cobb-Douglas production technology
kαt (i)n
1−α
t (i) = yt(i)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the capital elasticity with respect to output. The first-order necessary














where mct(i) is the Lagrange multiplier of the technological constraint which coincides with
the firm-level real marginal cost. Combining both (3.1) and (3.2), we obtain the capital-labor








Notice that every firm has the same capital-labor ratio, which implies that the real marginal









Next, we will introduce two different price-adjustment schemes.
Optimal Price Under Calvo Scheme
Following Calvo (1983), let us assume that, in every period, there is a constant probability,
0 < η < 1, that firms will not be able to change prices. If the reresentative firm i receives the








































After some algebra, equation (3.3) can be solved for the optimal price which, in a steady state,





1− βη(1 + π)θ−1
1− βη(1 + π)θ
]
Pmc (3.4)
Optimal Price Under Taylor Scheme
Alternatively, it could be assumed that firms adjust the price with a constant frequency as
proposed by Taylor (1980). In particular, firms decide new prices every J quarters, remaining
unchanged meanwhile. Hence, the optimal-price decision for the representative firm is made
7Variables with no time subscript indicate their value in steady state.
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As in the previous case, this equation can be solved for the optimal price which, in a steady





1− βJ(1 + π)Jθ
1− βJ(1 + π)J(θ−1)
1− β(1 + π)θ−1




3.3.1 Inflation, the Mark-up and the Welfare Cost
The market power that firms have under monopolistic competition produces a positive mark-up
of prices over marginal cost. This mark-up creates an inefficient wedge between the marginal
productivities of capital and labor and their corresponding marginal payments, i.e. the real
wage, w, and the real rental rate on capital, rk, respectively.8 Consequently, the equilibrium
levels of capital and labor, and hence output, under monopolistic competition are lower than
in an economy with perfect competition. Therefore, a higher mark-up implies a lower output
produced in the economy. This distortion, whose presence is solely stemming from monopolistic
competition, is what motivates the search for policies that monetary and fiscal authorities
could use to reduce the mark-up and, therefore, improve the aggregate economic activity. In
particular, in this paper we look for the (constant) steady-state inflation rate that maximizes
welfare.9 Not surprisingly, this is equivalent to finding the inflation rate that minimizes the
mark-up. Hence, in the following, an analysis of the effects that steady-state inflation has on
the mark-up, and subsequently on welfare, will be carried out.
Even though the presence of a positive mark-up is independent from the existence of sticky
prices, its size actually depends on both the scheme and degree of price stickiness. By looking
8In other words, the real marginal cost in equations (3.1) and (3.2) is lower than one.
9This is what King and Wolman (1999) define as the monetary modified golden rule.
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at equations (3.4) and (3.5), we notice that the optimal price is equal to the product of the
firm-level mark-up and the nominal marginal cost. In turn, the firm-level mark-up can be de-
composed into its constant component θ/(θ−1), and a model-specific component that depends
on the price stickiness parameter (η and J , respectively in the Calvo and Taylor specifications).
In both variants, the firm-level mark-up is increasing in inflation. This seems intuitive, if there
is positive inflation the firms that have the opportunity to adjust their price will increase it.
If we multiply both sides of equations (3.4) and (3.5) by P/P (i), we find the aggregate
price as a proportion, µ, of the nominal marginal cost: P = µPmc. Therefore, µ is the average
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1− βJ(1 + π)Jθ
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Notice that the average mark-up of the economy is the product of the firm-level mark-up and
the inverse of the relative price, P/P (i) which is a good indicator of price dispersion due to the
price stickiness.10 Computing the aggregate Dixit-Stiglitz price level, it can be seen that the
relationship between steady-state inflation, π, and P/P (i), depends on the price-adjustment

















1− (1 + π)J(θ−1)




In both cases, (3.8) and (3.9) show that P/P (i) falls with the inflation rate, π.
The steady-state relation between the average mark-up and inflation is finally obtained by
inserting equations (3.8) and (3.9) into (3.6) and (3.7), respectively. This allows us to write
down, for both the Calvo and Taylor cases, the steady-state average mark-up, µ = mc−1,
10If P/P (I) is different from one, there is price dispersion. With positive steady-state inflation, π > 0, the
value of P/P (I) is lower than one. With negative steady-state inflation, π < 0, the value of P/P (I) is greater
than one.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Description
ρ 0.005 Discount rate
θ 6 Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticity
σ 1.25 Risk Aversion
γ 2 Labor elasticity
ϕ 0.55 Labor Disutility
α 0.36 Capital Share
δ 0.025 Capital Depreciation Rate
η 0.75 Calvo Stickiness
J 4 Taylor Stickiness
as a function of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity parameter θ, the rate of discount ρ (through the
discount factor β = (1 + ρ)−1), the level of price rigidity, either η or J , and the steady-state
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As we just discussed, steady-state inflation has opposing effects on the average mark-up of the
economy. On one hand, higher inflation leads to a higher firm-level mark-up, which increases
the average mark-up. On the other hand, higher inflation leads to higher price dispersion (lower
P/P (i)), which decreases the average mark-up. Our numerical simulations have found that the
latter effect dominates over the former effect because the mark-up falls as the steady-state rate
of inflation marginally rises from 0%. Therefore, the rate of inflation that minimizes the mark-
up is slightly positive. Actually, we have checked that the rate of inflation that minimizes
the mark-up is also the rate of inflation that maximizes both output and household utility
(welfare). Hence, the optimal steady-state rate of inflation is not 0%, it is a small positive
number.
Let us calibrate the parameters of the model and provide some numerical results. We
assume that each period represents a quarter. In the baseline calibration, we set ρ = 0.005, so
that the annual rate of discount is equal to 2%, and θ = 6, which implies a mark-up of prices
over the marginal cost approximately equal to 20%. Table 3.1 contains the calibration for the
remaining parameters, borrowing usual values taken in the related literature. For comparative
purposes, let the degree of price stickiness under Calvo and Taylor schemes (parameterized
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Figure 3.1: Welfare Cost of Steady-State Inflation, % of Output
































by η and J , respectively) be the same. Hence, Q denotes the average number of quarters
without price adjustment. Thus the cases η = [0.5, 0.75, 0.875] and J = [2, 4, 8] represent three
situations for both pricing specifications in which Q is two quarters (half a year), four quarters
(one year) and eight quarters (two years).11
Figure 3.1 displays the optimal steady-state rate of inflation as the value that minimizes
the welfare cost. The welfare cost is measured as the percent of output that represents the
consumption equivalence, i.e. the required increase in the amount of consumption to reach the
maximum household utility (welfare) obtained at the optimal inflation rate. These welfare
costs are displayed in Figure 3.1 for different values of steady-state inflation (ranging from -1%
to 1.5% in annualized terms), for both pricing schemes and for several degrees of price rigidity.
Remarkably, all the sticky-price specifications give a minimum welfare cost of inflation at a
steady-state rate of inflation between 0% and 0.5%, closer to 0.5% than to 0%. It means that
neither the Chicago rule (−400 ρ
1−ρ ≈ −2%) nor the 0% rate of inflation are optimal. The
numerical solution of the model indicates that the optimal rate of inflation is very close to
0.33% for the three different levels of price stickiness (Q=2, Q=4, Q=8), with Calvo pricing
as well as Taylor pricing. Therefore, the degree of price stickiness in either model has very
11Note that under Calvo pricing, Q = (1− η)−1, whereas under Taylor pricing Q = J .
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little effect on the optimal rate of inflation in steady state.12 However, both the type and the
degree of price stickiness crucially determine the size of the welfare cost of inflation. With
Calvo staggered prices the welfare losses are clearly larger than with Taylor prices because
the mark-up increases much more rapidly when steady-state inflation moves from its optimal
value.13 In addition, the longer the average time without adjusting prices (Q), the larger the
welfare cost is when inflation deviates from the optimal rate. Table 3.2 reports the welfare
costs of 2%, 5% and 10% annual inflation in both specifications:







3.3.2 Staggered Prices and the Optimal Steady-State Inflation
After showing that the optimal rate of inflation in steady-state is robust to both different
pricing schemes and different degrees of price stickiness, we conduct a sensitivity analysis for
alternative calibrations of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity, θ, and the rate of discount, ρ. Our
objective is to check whether the result found in the previous section holds for different values
of these key parameters.
Figure 3.2 plots the optimal rate of inflation, in both the Calvo and Taylor specifications,
for a reasonable range of values of θ and ρ. It is straightforward to notice that both graphs
are almost identical to each other, which supports the fact that the optimal inflation rate is
independent from the pricing scheme for any value on the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity, θ, and the
rate of discount, ρ. Also, it can be noticed that either higher discount rates or lower values
of the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity (i.e. higher monopolistic power) lead to a higher optimal rate
of inflation. However, Figure 3.2 does not provide any information about how the degree of
price stickiness influences the optimal rate of inflation. To overcome this, Table 3.3 reports the
optimal inflation rates for the combinations of cases with θ = [4, 6, 10] and ρ = [0.005, 0.01],
for the Calvo and Taylor specifications and different degrees of price stickiness.
12This seems surprising because the steady-state relationships (3.10) and (3.11), include the price stickiness
parameters η and J . Furthermore, these equations look significantly different yet yield nearly the same optimal
rate of inflation.
13The same result has been found by Kiley (2002).
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By looking at Table 3.3, we can conclude that once ρ and θ are set, not only the sticky-price
specification (either á la Calvo or á la Taylor) does not matter for the optimal rate of inflation
but also that both schemes provide very similar numbers for any degree of price stickiness, Q.
There is just one minor difference. The Calvo pricing seems to give slightly higher rates of
inflation than the Taylor one, especially when there is great price stickiness (see the cases with
Q=8). However, the difference is quantitatively very small.
Table 3.3: Optimal Annual Rates of Inflation (%) for Different Sticky-Price Specifications







Q=2 0.5015 0.4974 0.5000 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.2012 0.2012 0.2000
Q=4 0.5055 0.4974 0.5000 0.3373 0.3333 0.3333 0.2012 0.2012 0.2000
Q=8 0.5135 0.4974 0.5000 0.3413 0.3333 0.3333 0.2052 0.2012 0.2000







Q=2 1.0060 0.9979 1.0000 0.6736 0.6656 0.6666 0.4054 0.3973 0.4000
Q=4 1.0220 0.9979 1.0000 0.6816 0.6656 0.6666 0.4094 0.3973 0.4000
Q=8 1.0540 0.9979 1.0000 0.7057 0.6656 0.6666 0.4254 0.3973 0.4000
An additional remarkable result is that the optimal rate of inflation can be fairly well
approximated by the ratio 400ρ
θ
. Thus, the ratio of the annualized rate of discount (400ρ) over
the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity (θ) provides a very accurate approximation to the annual rate of
inflation that would maximize welfare in steady state. Consequently, doubling the discount
rate approximately doubles the optimal rate of inflation.
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Summarizing, the optimal steady state rate of inflation is a slightly positive number, which
is not determined by the price-adjustment scheme or the degree of price stickiness. Rather, it
is well characterized by the ratio between two of the model parameters, the discount rate (ρ)
in the numerator, and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity (θ) in the denominator.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have computed the welfare-maximizing rate of inflation in the steady state
of a monopolistic competition model under two different sticky-price specifications: the Calvo
(1983) fixed probability and Taylor (1980) staggered contracts. The maximum welfare is ob-
tained at a steady-state rate of inflation that leads to the minimum mark-up. This optimal rate
of inflation is a positive number. Furthermore, its value is fairly well represented by the ratio
between the annual rate of discount and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity. This result is remarkably
robust to changes in either the pricing scheme or the level of price stickiness.
The welfare cost of steady-state inflation is rather small. In the baseline calibration with
ρ = 0.005 and θ = 6, the welfare cost of a 5% annual steady-state inflation is a permanent
0.17% of output with Calvo pricing and just 0.013% with Taylor contracts.
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3.5 Appendix A
Steady State Equilibrium Conditions
We have a system of 10 equations for 10 endogenous variables (c, k, r, rk, b, w, n, y, mc, µ).
• Overall Resources Constraint




1 = β(1 + r) (A3.2)
• No arbitrage
r = rk − δ (A3.3)
• Labor supply
ϕnγ = c−σw (A3.4)
• Bond supply
b = 0 (A3.5)
• Output





















µ = mc−1 (A3.9)
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This thesis has addressed three important issues in macroeconomics. First, it has analyzed
the role of risk aversion heterogeneity on entrepreneurship, saving behavior and the wealth
distribution. It has been shown that the introduction of risk aversion heterogeneity is key
because it allows to disentangle the effects that risk aversion and financial frictions have on
entrepreneurship, which is a key driver of wealth inequality. Second, it has been demonstrated
that the presence of long-term business relationships and bargaining over sticky prices reduce
both the allocative role of intermediate prices and the real effects of monetary policy shocks.
And third, it has been found that the optimal rate of inflation in steady state, in a model with
monopolistic competition under two prominent sticky-price specifications, is always positive,
regardless of the degree of price stickiness.
The methodology used in the analysis of these three articles has been crucial for the validity
and relevance of the results obtained. Throughout this thesis it has been demonstrated that
dynamic general equilibrium models are a powerful analytical tool for economists because they
allow addressing complex issues by offering a simplified and coherent version of reality.
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Conclusiones Generales
Esta tesis ha abordado tres temas importantes en Macroeconomı́a. Primero, se ha analizado el
efecto de la heterogeneidad en la aversión al riesgo sobre el emprendimiento, el comportamiento
del ahorro y la distribución de la riqueza. Se ha demostrado que la introducción de la hetero-
geneidad en la aversión al riesgo es clave porque permite desentrañar los efectos que la aversión
al riesgo y las fricciones financieras tienen sobre el emprendimiento, que es un factor clave para
explicar la desigualdad en la acumulación de la riqueza. En segundo lugar, se ha demostrado
que la presencia de relaciones comerciales a largo plazo y los procesos de negociación sobre
precios con rigidez reducen el papel de asignación de los precios intermedios y los efectos reales
de las perturbaciones de la poĺıtica monetaria. Y tercero, se ha encontrado que la tasa óptima
de inflación en estado estacionario, en un modelo con competencia monopoĺıstica y bajo dos
especificaciones de rigidez de precios diferentes, siempre es positiva, independientemente del
grado de rigidez de precios.
La metodoloǵıa utilizada en el análisis de estos tres art́ıculos ha sido crucial para la validez y
relevancia de los resultados obtenidos. A lo largo de esta tesis, se ha demostrado que los modelos
dinámicos de equilibrio general son una herramienta anaĺıtica poderosa para los economistas
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